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Abstract
This article examines how rms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market
power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing
strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy
retailing, where risk averse rms decide on their hedging strategies before their product
market strategies. We nd that hedging modies the pricing and production strategies
of rms. This strategic e¤ect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e.,
the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders risk
aversion. It has opposite e¤ects depending on the nature of product market competition:
hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, if rms
can decide not to commit on their hedging position, this can never be an equilibrium outcome:
committing is always a best response to non committing. In the Hotelling model, committing
is a dominant strategy for all rms.
JEL Classication: L13, G32
Keywords: Risk Management, Price and Quantity Competition.
Corresponding Author: Jean-Charles Rochet, University of Zürich, Department of
Banking and Finance, Plattenstrasse 32, CH-8032 Zürich, Phone +41 446344055.
1 Introduction
Most formal analyses of corporate risk management decisions consider price-taking rms that
face volatile cash ows. For example, small rms producing commodities or raw materials
(e.g., metals and minerals, oil and gas, electric power) face output price volatility. They can
use derivatives contracts to hedge against uctuations of the output prices. This standard,
"non-strategic" risk management logic also applies to rms facing input price volatility,
provided they do not exert market power in either their input or product markets.
However, when rms facing input price volatility have some degree of market power in
their product market, their strategies become more elaborate. A rms hedging modies its
realized input cost, hence its product market strategy. Thus, the rm alters the competitive
dynamics in its industry, and must take into account the behavior of its competitors.
This situation occurs in many industries. For example, electricity retailers purchase power
on wholesale markets and resell it to their retail customers. In Britain, the electricity and
gas regulatory agency (Ofgem (2008), page 10) indicates that: "there is evidence that the
(6 largest suppliers) seek to benchmark their hedging strategies against each other in order
to minimize the risk of their wholesale costs diverging materially from the competition".
Suppliers thus appear to include their competitorshedging strategy in their own hedging
strategy, and ultimately their product market strategy.
Airlines also constitute a relevant example. Carter et al. (2006) report that, over the
period 1992   2003, fuel price represented more than 13% of airlines operating costs, and
exhibited annualized volatility of 27%. Airlines do not exert market power in the fuel market,
yet they are an oligopoly on specic routes (see for example Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)).
The food processing industry provides another example. Food processing rms are ex-
posed to volatile feedstock prices (e.g., grains, tobacco). They may not exert market power
in the feedstock markets, however most empirical studies document market power in their
product markets: see for example the survey by Sheldon and Sperling (2001).
As the examples above suggest, the interaction between hedging and product market
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strategies is relevant for multiple industries. Yet, the academic literature on the strategic
aspects of hedging is small, for, in most cases, a separation (or dichotomy) property exists:
hedging is found to have no impact on product market strategy (see for example the references
in Dionne and Santugini (2013)). This article is among the few that explicitly establishes a
link between hedging and product market strategy when rms compete in quantity (Cournot)
and in price (di¤erentiated Bertrand).
We focus the analysis on risk-averse rms that hedge before deciding their product market
strategies. The empirical relevance of this choice is justied in Section 3. Formally, we use
two-stage games: rms rst determine their hedging strategy, then determine their product
market strategy (quantity or price), conditional on their rst-stage choice.
We rst analyze quantity competition. We prove that the rst-order conditions charac-
terizing the equilibrium of the (second-stage) production game are similar to the standard
Cournot case, except that risk-adjusted expected costs replace marginal costs. The intuition
is that investors value a marginal cost increase using the probability measure induced by
their marginal utility of wealth in each state of the world, and not the physical probability
measure. This risk-adjusted expected marginal cost is determined in equilibrium, and is
decreasing in own hedging. Thus, a rm that increases its hedging becomes more aggressive
(Lemma 2).
An equilibrium of the production game always exists. If rmsabsolute risk aversion is
constant (or does not vary too much), this equilibrium is unique, and an increase in own
hedging reduces the other rms equilibrium output (Proposition 2). If a symmetric equilib-
rium of the (rst-stage) hedging game exists, hedging toughens quantity competition: rms
hedge more than their (anticipated) equilibrium production, thus committing to produce
more than if their costs were constant and equal to the expected cost under the physical
probability measure (Proposition 3).
We establish similar results for price competition, although we reach the opposite con-
clusion: hedging softens price competition. As with quantity competition, risk-adjusted
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expected marginal costs, determined in equilibrium, replace constant marginal costs in the
rst-order conditions characterizing the equilibrium of the pricing game. Since risk-adjusted
expected costs are decreasing in own hedging, a rm that increases its hedging becomes more
aggressive (Lemma 3).
As with quantity competition, an equilibrium of the pricing game always exists. If ab-
solute risk aversion is constant, the equilibrium is unique, and an increase in own hedging
reduces the other rms equilibrium price. The crucial di¤erence with quantity competition
is that hedging softens pricing competition: rms hedge less than their (anticipated) equi-
librium production, thus committing to a price higher than if their cost was constant and
equal to the expected cost under the physical probability measure (Proposition 5).
Finally, we examine the strategic incentives to commit to a hedging position (Proposition
6). The above results are derived under the assumption that Boards of Directors impose that
rms commit to their hedging position. This is usually meant to limit speculation by traders.
Ignoring that objective, does commitment arise in equilibrium?
We show that, whether rms compete in quantity or in price, committing is a rms
best response to the other not committing. Thus universal non commitment never arises
as an equilibrium. Furthermore, in the particular case of the Hotelling model (where rms
compete in price and total demand is inelastic) commitment is a dominant strategies for all
rms.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the links with the literature.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes quantity competition. Section 5 analyzes
price competition. Section 6 examines incentives to commit to hedging decisions. Technical
proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
As mentioned previously, only a few articles examine the interaction between hedging and
product market strategies. They are reviewed below.
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Dionne and Santugini (2013) examine a two-stage game related to ours. In the rst
stage, rms decide to enter the market (or not). In the second stage, risk averse rms facing
a volatile input price compete à la Cournot in their output market, and simultaneously
determine their hedging strategy. As they solve the game backwards, Dionne and Santugini
(2013) nd that both hedging and product market strategies depend on the number of rms in
the market. The latter is then determined in equilibrium, and is a function of the volatility
of input price, the level of forward prices, and rms risk aversion. There are two main
di¤erences with our model: we consider a mature market where the number of active rms
is xed, while Dionne and Santugini (2013) look at markets where new rms can enter. The
second di¤erence is that in our model rms commit ex ante to their hedging strategies (more
on this in the next section) while in Dionne and Santugini (2013) hedging and quantities are
jointly determined: rms use hedging as a strategic commitment device in our model, while
they use market entry in Dionne and Santugini (2013).
Allaz and Villa (1993) look at rms that are large enough to exert market power on both
the spot and the forward markets. There is no uncertainty. In the spot market (stage 2), a
rm that has already sold a share of its output faces lower incentives to withhold output. In
the forward market (stage 1), rms face a prisoner dilemma, and cannot resist selling output
forward. Thus the existence of forward contracts reduces rmsmarket power. This result
is very similar to our Proposition 6, even though the setting is di¤erent: rms in Allaz and
Villa sell output in spot and forward markets where they exert market power, while in ours,
rms exert no market power in the spot and forward markets for input.
Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) examine two-period games in the presence of nan-
cial constraints: rmshedging decision in the rst-period a¤ects their investment capacity,
hence their protability in the second period. They show that asymmetric equilibria arise:
in equilibrium, some rms hedge, while others do not. In their model, the presence of -
nancial constraints and the resulting potential underinvestment is the conduit for strategic
interaction. Similarly, Loss (2012) examines the interaction between hedging demand and
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the characteristics of investment opportunities in the presence of nancial constraints. Us-
ing a reduced form for prot functions, he nds that a rms hedging demand is high when
investments are strategic substitutes, and low when they are strategic complements. In this
article, by contrast, prices and outputs are endogenized together with hedging positions.
Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002) consider a duopoly with asymmetric exposure to an
exchange rate, and determine the optimal pass-through and related exposure. While the
problem is related to the one examined here, the analytical approach is very di¤erent: they
treat the exchange rate as a xed input price, not as a stochastic variable. Recently, Nocke
and Thanassoulis (forthcoming) examine how credit constraints, making rms endogenously
risk averse, impact vertical relationships in the supply chain. They nd that, in the short
run, the optimal supply contract involves risk sharing and double marginalization.
This article also is methodologically related to the literature on the strategic impact of
rmsnancial structure1, that was initiated by Brander and Lewis (1986). Brander and
Lewis (1986) examine a two stage game. In the rst stage, rms determine their debt level.
In the second stage, they compete à la Cournot, facing uncertainty on their protability.
Brander and Lewis (1986) nd that, in the states of the world where marginal protability
is higher, an increase in debt increases the equilibrium output, which echoes our Proposition
2. They also nd that the equilibrium level of debt is excessive from the industrys point of
view, which echoes our Proposition 6.
Our analytical approach, namely the use of two-stage games, is identical to Brander
and Lewis (1986). However, we examine a di¤erent decision by rms: hedging and not
capital structure. Specically, we show that rms can use risk management as a strategic
instrument, as powerful as debt.
1A review of this literature can be found in Tirole (2006), Chapter 7.
5
3 Quantity Competition: the Model
Consider two identical rms, indexed by i = 1; 2, competing à la Cournot. Firm i produces qi
units of output, total production is Q = q1+ q2, and inverse demand P (Q). The technology
is linear: each unit of input, that costs ~c, is transformed into one unit of output. Firm is
commercial prot is thus:
C (qi; qj; ~c) = qi (P (Q)  ~c) :
3.1 Uncertainty on input costs and risk management
Ex ante, the input cost ~c is a random variable, with a cumulative distribution function G (:)
on a bounded support. Firms can hedge some of their risk on input cost ~c by buying forward
contracts at (unit) price F . To eliminate speculative motives for hedging, we assume that
F = E [~c]. There are no transaction costs associated with hedging. Thus, at t = 2 (i.e., once
the input cost ~c is known), the prot function of rm i that has purchased forward quantity
Hi at price F is:
i= (qi; qj; Hi; ~c) = qi (P (Q)  ~c) +Hi (~c  F )
= qi (P (Q)  F )  (qi  Hi) (~c  F ) :
The rst expression for rm i0s prot corresponds to adding to its commercial prot the
net gain (or loss) on its forward position Hi. The second expression shows an equivalent
decomposition: rm i can consider that its production cost is F , and its net (unhedged)
exposure to input price uctuations (qi  Hi).
Firms do not have market power in the spot and forward markets for input, even though
they do exert market power in their product market. We also assume that rms choose their
outputs (or prices) before input costs are realized. This is the case for most manufacturing
industries2: producers (e.g., car manufacturers) commit to a product price or volume for
2This assumption does not apply to industries where output price is exible. For example delivery services
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the relevant period (typically one or two quarters). During that period, input prices (e.g.,
aluminum and steel prices) vary. This assumption also holds for the electricity supply in-
dustry. For example in the United Kingdom, electricity retail rates typically change only 3
or 4 times a year, while wholesale power prices vary continuously.
Two other assumptions are crucial for risk management to have any strategic value. First,
each rm must be able to publicly commit to its hedging decision. Second, rms must be
"risk averse", in the sense that shareholder value can be measured by the expectation of
some concave function of prot. We now motivate these assumptions.
3.2 Public commitment to the hedging decision
Except for Section 6, we assume throughout this article that rms publicly commit to their
hedging decisions (H1; H2) before they select their output (or prices). This assumption can
be justied as follows.
First, nancial regulations require rms to publish, in their quarterly statements, a de-
scription of their portfolio of forward purchases and sales. While some discretion still exists
in disclosure, an outside party can get a close picture of a rms hedging portfolio. For
example, Jin and Jorion (2007) were able to compute the delta-equivalent of the forward
portfolio for US oil and gas companies. Also, as previously mentioned, electricity suppliers
in Britain infer each others hedging portfolio from nancial statements and other public
information.
Second, industrial rms can and in practice do commit to a hedging strategy through
their risk management policy. Forward sales and purchases, that require the use of deriv-
atives, are usually handled with extreme caution by Board of Directors, concerned about
(e.g., Fedex and UPS) explicitly include in their published rate a fuel surcharge schedule, that depends on
the price of an oil index. Similarly, electricity suppliers in Norway o¤er retail contracts explicitly adjusted
to the wholesale power price.
When rms set production after the input price is realized, the prot from the hedge is known before
the production decision is made, thus has no impact on it. Firms cannot do any better than standard
deterministic prot maximization. Knowing that, when rms make the hedging decision, they follow the
"standard" non-strategic risk management logic.
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potential speculative behavior by traders. Boards then require management to dene and
follow a clear hedging strategy. As mentioned earlier, this position is communicated to
investors and regulators. Management has then limited discretion to deviate from it.
Without commitment on hedging, no strategic interaction would arise and there would
be a dichotomy between hedging and production. Suppose indeed that rms select output,
then hedge. Reasoning backwards, consider rst the hedging decision, once production is
known. Since (i) rms are risk averse, and (ii) there are no transaction costs nor expected
gain from hedging (i.e., E [~c]   F = 0), full hedging is the optimal strategy. Consider now
the production decision. Knowing that input costs will be perfectly covered at the forward
price, rms play a symmetric Cournot game with constant marginal costs equal to F . The
same reasoning holds for price competition.
Thus, this article is focussed on situations where risk-averse rms hedge before making
their production (or price) decision.
3.3 Objective function
To obtain a strategic impact of risk management, a crucial ingredient is that rms be risk-
averse. Thus, we assume that each rm i maximizes some expected utility U (i) of its
prots i, where U (:) is increasing, concave and exhibits non-increasing absolute risk aversion
()   U 00
U 0 (). This is a natural assumption when the rm is owned by a small number of
shareholders who cannot fully diversify. This is also a convenient reduced form for widely
held rms when there are nancial frictions3. These nancial frictions can take the form
of a wedge between the costs of external and internal nance (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein
(1993)), transaction costs on primary security markets (Décamps et al. (2011)), or agency
costs (DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais et al. (2007)). In each of these cases, shareholder
3If nancial markets were complete and frictionless, the Modigliani and Miller theorem would apply. In
particular risk management would not create any value for shareholders.
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value can be represented as the expectation of a concave function4 of future prots. For
simplicity, we consider a symmetric model where U (:) is the same for all rms. At date
t = 0, the shareholder value of rm i is then
vi = v (qi; qj; Hi) = E [U ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))] = E [U (qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F ))] :
We look for subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game played by rms. We use
backward induction: we rst determine the second-stage equilibrium (q (H1; H2) ; q (H2; H1)),
and then compute the rst-stage payo¤functions Vi = V (Hi; Hj)  vi(q (Hi; Hj) ; q (Hj; Hi) ; Hi).
4 Strategic use of hedging
4.1 An illustrative example
Before turning to the general Cournot model, we illustrate the main insights with a simple
example: (i) Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), i.e. U (x) = 1   exp ( x), (ii)
linear inverse demand P (Q) = 1   Q, and (iii) normally distributed5 input cost ~c, with
mean F and standard deviation . In this case,
v (qi; qj; Hi) = E [1  exp (  (qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F )))] = 1 exp ( m (qi; qj; Hi))
where
mi = m (qi; qj; Hi) = qi (1 Q  F )   (Hi   qi)
2 2
2
is the certainty equivalent of rm i0s prot. Maximizing vi is equivalent to maximizing mi.
Now
@mi
@qi
= 1  2qi   qj   F + 2 (Hi   qi) :
First note that @mi
@qi
is decreasing in qi (which means that mi is concave in qi) and in qj
4We take U as exogenous. A fully dynamic model, with explicit modelling of nancial frictions, would
allow to endogenize U . This is done by Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) in a non-strategic context. Extending
it to a strategic context would be di¢ cult and is outside the scope of the present paper.
5Assuming normal distributions has the usual drawback that costs can take arbitrarily large (or negative)
values, and thus equilibrium prices or quantities can be negative, which of course is meaningless from the
economic viewpoint. However, for reasonable values of the parameters, the probability of negative prices
and quantities is essentially zero, and our equilibria are essentially identical to the fully correct ones that
would have been obtained with appropriately truncated normal distributions.
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(which means that quantities are strategic substitutes: rm i produces less if its competitor
produces more). Note again that if hedging Hi was determined simultaneously with output
qi; rms would choose complete hedging Hi = qi and we would be back to the Cournot model
with deterministic cost F . Thus our assumption that hedging is determined before output
is decided is crucial for risk management to play any strategic role.
The rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions characterizing the equilibrium are
qi
 
2 + 2

+ qj = 1  F + 2Hi (i = 1; 2); (1)
which yields the unique equilibrium of the second-stage game:
qi = q
 (Hi; Hj) =
1  F + 2
1+2
[(2 + 2)Hi  Hj]
3 + 2
(i = 1; 2):
Thus V (Hi; Hj) = 1  exp ( M (Hi; Hj)), where
Mi =M (Hi; Hj) = m (q
 (Hi; Hj) ; q (Hj; Hi) ; Hi) ;
is the certainty equivalent of rm i0s prot in the production game (stage 1). Now6,
@Mi
@Hi
=
@mi
@qi
@qi
@Hi
+
@mi
@qj
@qj
@Hi
+
@mi
@Hi
=

qi P
0
(Q)
@qj
@Hi
  (Hi   qi ) 2

= 2[Hi  

1 +
1
(3 + 2) (1 + 2)

qi ]:
The necessary rst-order conditions of the hedging game (stage 1) are then:
Hi =

1 +
1
(3 + 2) (1 + 2)

qi (i = 1; 2):
Since M is concave in its rst argument, these conditions are also su¢ cient. Replacing qi
6Note that @mi@qi = 0 by the equilibrium condition of the second-stage game.
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by q (Hi; Hj) and solving for the rst stage equilibrium yields a unique solution, which is
symmetric (qi = q

j = q
; Hi = H

j = H
), characterized by
H = q(1 +
1
(3 + 2) (1 + 2)
) > q; and q =
1  F
3  2
(3+2)(1+2)
>
1  F
3
:
Note that 1 F
3
would be the equilibrium output of each rm in the absence of commitment
on hedging. These results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that rms compete in quantities, have a constant absolute risk aver-
sion, demand is linear, and costs are normally distributed. Then the two-stage game has a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which is symmetric. Firms over hedge and produce more
than in the absence of commitment on hedging.
Thus, with our simple specication, committing ex-ante on their hedging positions makes
Cournot competitors more aggressive. If hedging was done after (or together with) output
decisions, shareholders would be collectively better-o¤: prices and prots would be higher
and rms would be perfectly hedged against input price uctuations7. As we now see, these
features also hold under more general conditions on utility, demand, and cost distribution.
4.2 The general case
In order to extend the analysis to a more general specication, we rst need to guarantee
the existence and unicity of a Cournot equilibrium in the second stage of the game, for any
couple of hedging strategies (Hi; Hj) of the rst stage. For this we impose classical conditions
that give existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium when rms have di¤erent costs
(see for example Vives (2001)).
7However, we show in Section 6 that it is never privately optimal for the shareholders of each of the rms
not to commit on their hedging positions. This is a prisonersdilemma type of situation.
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Assumption 1 For all Q  0, the inverse demand function P (:) satises
QP 00 (Q)
( P 0 (Q)) < 1 (2)
and
lim
Q!1
A (Q) = 0 and lim
Q!0
A (Q) = lim
Q!0
P (Q) = +1
where
A (Q) = 2P (Q) +QP
0
(Q) :
Under Assumption 1 the Cournot game with deterministic (but di¤erent) costs (ci; cj)
has natural properties that we will use in the sequel. In this game, rm is prot function
is:
C (qi; qj; ci) = qi (P (Q)  ci) :
Thus:
@Ci
@qi
= (P (Q)  ci) + qiP 0 (Q) = 0; (3)
and
@2Ci
(@qi)
2 = 2P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q) :
Lemma 1 Assumption 1 implies that, for all (c1; c2) there exists a unique Cournot equilib-
rium
 
qC (c1; c2) ; q
C (c2; c1)

. When this equilibrium is interior
 
qCi = q
C (ci; cj) > 0 for i = 1; 2

,
it satises @q
C
i
@ci
< 0 and
@qCj
@ci
> 0 for i = 1; 2.
Proof. The result is standard. For the readers convenience, the proof is presented in
Appendix A.1.
Thus, an increase in rm i0s marginal cost induces a reduction in its Cournot equilibrium
output qCi and an increase in the equilibrium output of its competitor q
C
j . This property will
be crucial for our results.
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We now return to the random cost case. The shareholder value of rm i is
vi = E [U (i)] = E [U (qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F ))] ;
and thus
@vi
@qi
=E

U 0 (i)
@i
@qi

= E
h
U 0 (i)

P (Q)  ~c+ qiP 0 (Q)
i
=E [U 0 (i)]

P (Q) + qiP
0
(Q)  bc (qi; qj; Hi) ;
where
bc  bc(qi; qj; Hi) = E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))] = F + cov [U
0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c)) ; ~c]
E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))]
(4)
is the risk-adjusted expected cost8 of rm i. Note that v (qi; qj; Hi) is concave in qi since
@2vi
(@qi)
2 = E
"
U
00
(i)

@i
@qi
2
+ U
0
(i)
@2i
(@qi)
2
#
< 0:
Therefore, if an interior Nash equilibrium
 
qi ; q

j

exists, it is determined by the rst order
conditions
P (Q) + qi P
0
(Q)  bc  qi ; qj ; Hi = 0; (i = 1; 2): (5)
Before proving existence of a Nash equilibrium and deriving su¢ cient conditions for unic-
ity, we examine system (5). The interaction between hedging and production is channelled
through the expected risk-adjusted cost bc (qi; qj; Hi), determined in equilibrium. If rm i pro-
duces one more unit at random cost ~c; the impact on shareholder value is E [U 0 (i) ~c] . More
generally, the marginal certainty equivalent of a random cash ow x (~c) for the shareholders
8The notion of risk-adjusted expectation is borrowed from mathematical nance, where it is used in
particular to price derivative contracts.
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of rm i is given by its risk-adjusted expectation:
bEi [x (~c)] = E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))x (~c)]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))] :
For example in the case of constant absolute risk aversion and normal distribution of
costs, the risk adjusted expected cost of rm i does not depend on its competitor output.
It is just equal to the expected cost F plus a risk premium that increases linearly with
unhedged output9 (qi  Hi) :
bc(qi; Hi)  E [U 0 (i) ~c]E [U 0 (i)] = F + 2 (qi  Hi)
It is increasing in qi, decreasing in Hi, and lower than the expected cost F if and only if
Hi > qi. When rmsabsolute risk aversion () =
 U 00()
U 0() is not constant, bci also depends
on the output of the other rm, which complicates the analysis10: bci  bc(qi; qj; Hi): However
the properties derived above are robust:
Lemma 2 :
@bc
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi
  0; and @bci
@Hi
< 0: (6)
bci  F , Hi  qi:
@bci
@qj
=  qiP 0 (Q) ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] ; (7)
thus 8><>:
@bci
@qj
= 0 if  () is constant
@bci
@qj
< 0, Hi > qi if  () is decreasing
: (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
9This can be seen by computing vi = E[U(i)] = U(mi) in two di¤erent ways:
@Ui
@Hi
= E[U 0(i) @i@Hi ] = E[U
0(i)(ec  F )] = E[U 0(i)][bci   F ] and
@Ui
@Hi
= U 0(mi)@mi@Hi = E[U
0(i)]2(qi  Hi):
10Dependency of bci with respect to qj is indirect. It is channelled through variations in absolute risk
aversion.
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At equilibrium, expected risk-adjusted marginal cost increases in qi as if there were
decreasing returns to scale. Increasing Hi reduces rm i0s risk-adjusted expected marginal
cost. This comes from the fact that a marginal increase in hedging decreases ex-post marginal
cost when ~ci > F and increases it when ~ci < F . Since favorable realizations are weighted by
a lower marginal utility, overall the risk-adjusted expected cost decreases.
We now turn to existence and unicity of the equilibrium of the production game. Since
we ultimately focus on symmetric equilibria (where H1 = H

2 = H, q

1 = q

2 = q
, bc1 = bc2),
we restrict our attention to the case where jH1  H2j is small enough that the equilibrium
of the production game is interior.
(q1; q

2) is thus a xed point of the function , dened from R2 into R2 by8><>:1 (q1; q2) = q
C (bc (q1; q2; H1) ;bc (q2; q1; H2))
2 (q1; q2) = q
C (bc (q2; q1; H2) ;bc (q1; q2; H1)) :
Proposition 2 For any (H1; H2) close enough to the diagonal, an equilibrium of the pro-
duction game exists. If absolute risk aversion is constant, this equilibrium is unique, and
denoted11 by qi = q
 (Hi; Hj) for i = 1; 2: Furthermore, a marginal increase in rm is
hedging reduces rm js equilibrium output:
@qj
@Hi
< 0:
Proof. For existence, we apply Brouwers xed point theorem to the mapping . Since by
assumption ec is bounded above by some constant c;
bc (qi; qj; Hi) = E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))]  c
for all (qi; qj; Hi). Now, since
@qC
@cj
(ci; cj)  0 and @qC@ci (ci; cj)  0:
qC (bc (qi; qj; Hi) ;bc (qj; qi; Hj))  qC (0; c)  qC :
Thus, we can limit our search to (qi; qj) 2

0; qC
2
. Since qC (x; y) and bc (x; y; :) are contin-
11Unicity of the equilibrium and symmetry of the game imply symmetry of the equilibrium.
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uous in (x; y), and dened on a compact and convex set of R2, Brouwers theorem implies
the existence of an equilibrium.
If absolute risk aversion is constant, we prove in Appendix A.3 that the real parts of the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
J (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
264 @qC1@q1   1 @qC1@q2
@qC2
@q1
@qC2
@q2
  1
375
are always negative, which implies that the equilibrium is unique. Finally, constant absolute
risk aversion also implies @bc
@qj
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0 by Lemma 2. Firms play a familiar Cournot
game with marginal costs bci increasing in qi at the equilibrium, and decreasing in Hi. We
prove in Appendix A.4 that, since increasing hedging reduces a rms cost, it makes it more
aggressive, and reduces its competitors output.
Proposition 2 shows that a marginal increase inHi reduces qj , and thus increases q

i , since
quantities are strategic substitutes. Another way to see this is that a marginal increase in Hi
reduces the risk-adjusted expected cost, because it decreases the unhedged input (qi  Hi) ;
and thus increases qi . Thus a marginal increase in Hi commits rm i to a higher output.
If risk aversion varies with prot, a "revenue e¤ect" arises. Equilibrium of the quantity
game may not always be unique. However, this e¤ect is of second-order importance if risk
aversion does not vary too much, and our basic conclusions remain valid12.
4.3 Equilibrium of the hedging game
Suppose a symmetric interior equilibrium of the hedging game (H; H) exists. Then we
have:
Proposition 3 1. H is characterized by the rst-order condition:
bc (q; q; H)  F + P 0 (Q) q @qj
@Hi
(H; H) = 0: (9)
12Proofs are available from the authors upon request.
16
2. If absolute risk aversion is constant, hedging toughens quantity competition: rms over-
hedge (H > q), and produce more than if they did not commit to their hedging
position: q > qC (F; F ) :
Proof.
1. For i = 1; 2 ,the rst-order conditions characterizing equilibrium hedging volumes Hi
are:
E

U 0 (i )

@i
@Hi
+
@i
@qj
@qj
@Hi
+
@i
@qi
@qi
@Hi

= 0:
Since @i
@Hi
= ~c   F , @i
@qj
= P
0
(Q) qi, and @@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0 by denition of qi , this
condition becomes
E[U 0 (i )

~c  F + P 0 (Q) qi
@qj
@Hi

] = 0:
Dividing by E [U 0 (i )] > 0 and setting H

i = H

j = H
 yields equation (9).
2. Since
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0, equation (9) yields bc (q; q; H) < F , H > q:Thus, at a
symmetric equilibrium, equation (5) yields
P (2q) + qP
0
(2q) = bc (q; q; H) < F = P  2qC (F; F )+ qC (F; F )P 0  2qC (F; F ) :
Assumption 2 implies that P (2q) + qP
0
(2q) is decreasing:

P (2q) + qP
0
(2q)
0
=
3P 0 (2q) + qP 00(2q) = [ P 0][ qP 00 P 0   3] < 0. Thus the above condition is equivalent
to q > qC (F; F ) :
A marginal increase in Hi has two e¤ects on rm is expected utility. First, a direct e¤ect
on expected cost : the rm substitutes input at known cost F for input at uncertain cost
~c. When taking the risk-adjusted expectation, this substitution is worth bc (qi; qj; Hi)   F .
Second, an indirect e¤ect, through the change in the other rms production: P
0
(Q) qi
@qj
@Hi
.
17
At equilibrium, both e¤ects exactly cancel out for both rms, which produces equilibrium
conditions (9).
Thus, since
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0 and P
0
(Q) qi < 0, rms set bc  qi ; qj ; Hi  < F . They
over hedge, i.e., hedge more than their (anticipated) production, so that their risk-adjusted
expected marginal cost is lower than their "physical" expected marginal cost E [~c] = F . This
leads them to become more aggressive, and produce more than if they were perfectly hedged.
Finally, combining rst-order conditions (5) and (9) yields:
P (Q) + qP
0
(Q) = F   P 0 (Q) q @q

j
@Hi
(H; H) ; (i = 1; 2) :
Comparing with rst-order condition (3) for ci = F , an additional term

 P 0 (Q) q @qj
@Hi
< 0

is added, that captures the strategic impact of rm is hedging on rm js production de-
cision. Since this term is negative, each rm will be "tougher" in the second-stage. In the
subgame perfect equilibrium, rms "invest" too much in hedging, in order to be tough in
the quantity game13.
5 Price competition
We now turn to price competition. As in the previous Section, we analyze the subgame
perfect equilibria of a two-stage game. In the rst stage, rms choose their hedging positions
(Hi;Hj): In the second stage, they compete in prices. We will show that the strategic impact
of hedging on price competition is exactly opposite to the one it has on quantity competition.
Since the method of resolution is similar in both cases, results are stated briey. We only
emphasize the di¤erences with quantity competition. As in the previous Section, we start
by illustrating the basic properties on a simple case.
13This is reminiscent of the "top dog e¤ect" in the taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
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5.1 An illustrative example
Consider a standard Hotelling model, where the demand faced by rm i is Di = D (pi; pj) =
1
2
+
pj pi
2t
. The prot functions are
i=

1
2
+
pj   pi
2t

(pi   ~c) +Hi (~c  F )
=

1
2
+
pj   pi
2t

(pi   F ) + (Hi   1
2
+
pj   pi
2t
) (~c  F ) :
Shareholder value of rm i is vi = v (pi; pj; Hi) = E [U (i)]. If absolute risk aversion 
is constant and costs are normally distributed with mean F and standard deviation , the
certainty equivalent of rm is prot is
mi = (
1
2
+
pj   pi
2t
)(pi   F )  
2
2
(Hi   1
2
  pj   pi
2t
)2:
Note again that if hedging was selected simultaneously with price, each rm would hedge
completely and we would be back to the Hotelling model with deterministic costs F: The
situation is di¤erent here since rms commit on their hedging positions before competing in
prices. We have:
@mi
@pi
=
1
2
+
pj   pi
2t
+
F   pi
2t
  
2
2t
(Hi   1
2
  pj   pi
2t
):
@mi
@pi
is decreasing in pi (indicating that mi is concave in pi) and increasing in pj (indicating
that prices are strategic complements: rm i charges a higher price if rm j does). Intro-
ducing the notation 
2
2t
= ", the rst order condition characterizing the price equilibrium
is
pi = F + t+ "t[1  2Hi]  (1 + ")(pj   pi); (i = 1; 2):
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Taking the di¤erence between these two equations and simplifying, we obtain
pi   pj = 2"t
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi);
and thus
pi  p(Hi; Hj) = F + t+ "t[1  2Hi  
2(1 + ")
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi)]; (i = 1; 2):
To compute the certainty equivalentMi of rm i0s prot in the hedging game, we replace
pi by its expression in the formula giving mi. We obtain:
Mi = t

1
2
  "
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi)

1 + "

1  2Hi   2(1 + ")
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi)

 "t

Hi   1
2
+
"
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi)
2
:
Mi is quadratic in (Hi; Hj) and strictly concave in Hi: Thus, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium of the rst-stage game, characterized by the rst order conditions. It is easy to see
that this equilibrium is symmetric: Hi = H

j = H
, where Hsatises: 1  2H = 1+"
3+2"
> 0:
Compared with the case where rms would hedge perfectly, equilibrium price and share-
holder value are higher:
pi = p

j = F + t+ "t
1 + "
3 + 2"
> F + t:
Mi =M

j =
t
2
[1 +
"(5 + 8"+ 3"2)
2(3 + 2")2
] >
t
2
:
These results are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 4 In the Hotelling model with normally distributed costs and constant absolute
risk aversion, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. It is symmetric (Hi = H

j = H
;
pi = p

j = p
): Firms under hedge (H < 1
2
), charge a higher price (p > F + t), and have
higher shareholder value than if they did not commit on hedging.
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Thus in the normal-Constant Absolute Risk Aversion case, commitment on risk manage-
ment allows Hotelling rms to compete less aggressively and secure higher margins. As we
now see, these features also hold more generally for di¤erentiated Bertrand competition.
5.2 The general model
Consider the general case of two symmetric rms that compete in prices. Firm i faces
demand Di = D (pi; pj), decreasing in its own price and increasing in the other rms price.
As in the Cournot case, we make assumptions that ensure that the second stage game has
a unique interior equilibrium. These assumptions bear on the asymmetric Bertrand game
where rms have di¤erent costs ci and cj; and rms i prot function is
Bi = 
B (pi; pj; ci) = D (pi; pj) (pi   ci) :
Assumption 2 : D (pi; pj) is such that:
(i) B is concave in its rst argument: @
2B
(@pi)
2 < 0 for all (pi; pj; ci) ;
(ii) for all (ci; cj) close enough to the diagonal14, the pricing game has a unique interior
equilibrium
 
pB (ci; cj) ; p
B (cj; ci)

(iii) prices are strategic complements: @
2B
@pi@pj
> 0 ;and
(iv) the own price e¤ect on demand is stronger than the other rms price e¤ect: @Di
@pi
+
@Di
@pj
 0 and @2Di
(@pi)
2 +
@2Di
@pi@pj
 0 for all (pi; pj) :
Assumption 2 is met for example in the Hotelling model considered above. In this case
equilibrium prices are: pB (ci; cj) = t+
2ci+cj
2
:
Concavity of the objective function and strategic complementarity of prices are met by
many demand functions. Unicity of equilibrium with deterministic input costs is required to
establish unicity with stochastic input costs. We prove in Appendix B.1 that when the own
price e¤ect is stronger than the others price e¤ect, an increase in one rms cost increases
both prices: @p
B
@ci
(ci; cj) > 0 and
@pB
@ci
(cj; ci) > 0:
14As in the Cournot case, jc1   c2j must be small enough to avoid a corner equilibrium.
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5.3 Strategic hedging
As before, we assume that the shareholder value of each rm equals the expected utility of
its prot:
vi = v (pi; pj; Hi) = E [U (i)] = E[UfD (pi; pj) (pi   ec) +Hi(ec  F )g]:
Thus
@vi
@pi
= E

U 0 (i)
@i
@pi

= E

U 0 (i) 

Di + (pi   ~c) @Di
@pi

= E [U 0 (i)]

Di + (pi   bci) @Di
@pi

;
where
bci = bc (pi; pj; Hi)  E [U 0 ( (pi; pj; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (pi; pj; Hi; ~c))] = F + cov [U
0 () ; ~c]
E [U 0 ()]
is the risk-adjusted expected cost of rm i. We prove in Appendix B.2 that this risk-adjusted
expected cost has similar (but not identical) properties to the Cournot case:
Lemma 3 :
@bc
@pi
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi
  0; and @bci
@Hi
< 0:
bci  F , Hi  D (pi; pj) :
@bci
@pj
=
@Di
@pj
n
(pi   bci) bE [ (i) (bci   ~c)] + bE  (i) (bci   ~c)2o :
Since @
2vi
@p2i
= E

U 00 (i)

@i
@pi
2
+ U 0 (i) @
2i
@p2i

< 0; v (pi; pj; Hi) is concave in pi: Thus if
an interior Nash equilibrium of the pricing game (p1; p

2) (H1; H2) exists, it is characterized
by the system of necessary rst-order conditions:
 
pi   bc  pi ; pj ; Hi @D@pi  pi ; pj+D  pi ; pj = 0; (i = 1; 2): (10)
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As will be proven below, this equilibrium of the pricing game exists, and, under certain
conditions, is unique, hence of the form (p (Hi; Hj) ; p (Hj; Hi)). The expected value of rm
i for its shareholders is Vi = V (Hi; Hj) = v (p (Hi; Hj) ; p (Hj; Hi) ; Hi). The equilibrium
of the two-stage game is then characterized as follows:
Proposition 5 1. For any (Hi; Hj) close enough to the diagonal, there exists an interior
equilibrium (p1; p

2) (H1; H2) of the pricing game. It is characterized by system (10):
2. If absolute risk aversion is constant, this equilibrium is unique, and a marginal hedging
increase by rm i reduces rm js equilibrium price:
@pj
@Hi
< 0:
3. Any interior equilibrium
 
Hi ; H

j

of the hedging game satises
bc  pi ; pj ; Hi = F + @D@pj
 
pi ; p

j

@D
@pi
 
pi ; p

j
D  pi ; pj @pj@Hi  Hi ; Hj  ; (i = 1; 2): (11)
4. If a symmetric interior equilibrium exists, and absolute risk aversion is constant, hedg-
ing softens price competition: rms under-hedge in order to induce higher prices than
if marginal costs were constant and equal to F :
H < D (p; p) and p > pB (F; F ) :
Proof. The proof follows the steps of Propositions 2 and 3. The risk-adjusted costs are
bounded, thus the set in which we look for a xed point is compact and convex in R2. Since
all functions are continuous, Brouwers xed point theorem guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium. If absolute risk aversion is constant, then Assumption 2 guarantees unicity of
the equilibrium and allows to sign the direction of the strategic e¤ect. Equation (11) is derived
similarly to equation (9). Comparison of equations (11) and (10) shows that hedging softens
price competition. Detailed proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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Combining the rst-order conditions yields:
(p   F ) @Di
@pi
(p; p) +D (p; p)  @Di
@pj
(p; p)D (p; p)
@pj
@Hi
(H; H) = 0:
Hedging has indeed a strategic e¤ect, captured by the term
@pj
@Hi
. Keeping some input price
exposure uncovered commits rms to be less aggressive. This commitment then yields a
higher equilibrium price : p > pE (F; F ). The direction of the strategic e¤ect is reversed
compared to Cournot competition: here, rms under-hedge, hence the equilibrium price is
increased. This stark di¤erence is best understood by comparing the rst-order conditions
(after appropriate transformations):
bci   F + @i
@qj
@qj
@Hi
= 0;
in the Cournot case, and
bci   F + @Di@pj
( @Di
@pi
)
D
 
pi ; p

j
 @pj
@Hi
= 0
in the case of di¤erentiated Bertrand. In both cases, when rm i increases hedging, rm j
reduces her strategic variable (quantity or price). If rms compete in quantity, when rm
j increases output, this reduces rm is prot

@i
@qj
< 0

: Therefore, at the equilibrium,
rm i over-hedges to set her risk-adjusted expected cost below F , and thus becomes more
aggressive. Conversely, if rms compete in price, when rm j raises his price, this increases
the demand faced by rm i0s

@Di
@pj
> 0

, hence rm i under-hedges to set her risk-adjusted
expected cost above F , and thus becomes less aggressive.
6 Incentives to commit on a hedging position
We have argued that rms commit to their hedging strategy because their Boards of Directors
do not want them to speculate: risk managers are not allowed to signicantly deviate from
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their pre-announced hedging position. This restriction has clear advantages in terms of
monitoring the activity of traders. However, we have seen that it is not always protable for
shareholders. In this Section, we set aside governance problems, and assume that rms are
free to decide ex-ante whether or not they want to commit to the hedging positions. This is
done by adding a prior stage to our sequential games.
The timing is now as follows: at t = 0, each rm decides either to Commit (C) or Not
Commit (NC) to its hedging position. At t = 1, rms that have chosen C publicly announce
their hedging position. At t = 2, rms compete (in quantities or in prices), and the rms
that have chosen (NC) decide on their hedging position. Finally, at t = 3, input cost is
realized, and prots are determined. We assume that there is a unique sub-game perfect
equilibrium at t = 1; independently of the commitments decisions made at t = 0 (this is the
case for example if rms have constant absolute risk aversion). The shareholder value of rm
i that plays strategy Xi 2 fC;NCg while rm j plays strategy Xj 2 fC;NCg is denoted
S (Xi; Xj) :
To focus on the strategic impact of hedging, we continue to assume that (i) there are
no transaction costs associated with hedging, and (ii) the forward price F is equal to the
expected spot price E [~c].
Proposition 6 1. Not Committing cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Whether rms
compete in quantity or in price: S (C;NC) > S (NC;NC) :
2. If rms compete in quantity, universal Not Commitment dominates universal Commit-
ment: S (NC;NC) > S (C;C) :
3. If rms compete à la Hotelling, have constant absolute risk aversion, and input costs are
normally distributed, universal Commitment dominates universal Non Commitment:
S (C;C) > S (NC;NC) and is a dominant strategy for all rms S (C;C) > S (NC;C) :
Proof. We rst prove point 1 if rms compete in quantity. Suppose rm 2 plays NC. If
rm 1 also plays NC, the shareholder value of both rms is S (NC;NC). Suppose now
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that rm 1 plays C. At t = 2, both rms select their output. Then, rm 2, which did not
commit, optimally selects complete hedging, while rm 1 has committed to H1. Assuming the
equilibrium (q1 (H1) ; q2 (H1)) is interior, it is characterized by the rst-order conditions:8><>: q2P
0
(q1 + q2) + P (q1 + q2)  F = 0
q1P
0
(q1 + q2) + P (q1 + q2)  bc (q1; q2; H1) = 0
At t = 1, rm 1 selects H1 to maximize Z (H1) = V (q1 (H1) ; q2 (H1) ; H1). If rm 1 selects
H1 = q
C (F; F ), then q1 = q2 = qC (F; F ) is a solution of the system, hence is the unique
Cournot equilibrium for H1 = qC (F; F ). It yields the expected payo¤ S (NC;NC). Thus
when rm 2 does not commit, rm 1 can guarantee itself at least S (NC;NC) by committing
to H1 = qC (F; F ). This implies that S (C;NC)  S (NC;NC). We now show that this
inequality is strict.
dZ
dH1
 
qC (F; F )

= E

U
0
(1)

q1P
0  
Q
 dq2
dH1
+ (~c  F )

= q1P
0  
Q
 dq2
dH1
E
h
U
0
(1)
i
since bc  qC (F; F ) ; qC (F; F ) ; qC (F; F ) = F . Then, since H1 = q1, @bc1@q2 = 0, hence dq2dH1 < 0.
Thus, dZ
dH1
 
qC (F; F )

> 0, which implies that maxH1 Z(H1) > Z
 
qE (F; F )
  S (NC;NC).
Thus: S (C;NC) > S (NC;NC) :
The proof of point 1 proceeds along the same lines if rms compete in price, and is pre-
sented in Appendix C, along with the formal proof of the other points. As expected, when
rms compete in quantity, (C;C) yields lower prices and higher volatility, hence lower ex-
pected utility than (NC;NC). However if rms compete à la Hotelling, the expected prot
increase more than compensates for the loss coming from increased volatility, hence (i) uni-
versal Commitment dominates universal Non Commitment: S (C;C) > S (NC;NC), and
(ii) is a dominant strategy for all rms: S (C;C) > S (NC;C).
Even though universal Non Commitment dominates when rms compete in quantity,
each rm prefers to Commit when the other does not. Thus, whether rms compete in
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quantity or in price, universal non Commitment can never be an equilibrium.
7 Concluding remarks
This article examines how rms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market
power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing
strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy
retailing, where risk averse rms decide on their hedging strategies before their product
market strategies. We nd that hedging modies the pricing and production strategies
of rms. This strategic e¤ect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e.,
the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders risk
aversion. It has opposite e¤ects depending on the nature of product market competition:
hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, if rms
can decide not to commit on their hedging position, this can never be an equilibrium outcome:
committing is always a best response to non committing. In the Hotelling model, committing
is a dominant strategy for all rms.
This paper could be extended in di¤erent directions. For example it would be interesting
to examine asymmetric situations, where one rm is market leader and announces its hedging
strategy before the other, or when di¤erent rms have di¤erent costs. Another possibility
would be to endogenize pricing exibility, i.e., to determine when it is optimal for rms not
to adjust their output prices to reect the realization of their input costs.
Finally, another avenue of research is to bring the model to the data, and in particular to
test the predictions as to how rmshedging decisions inuence their and their competitors
pricing strategies. For econometricians, this naturally leads to the question : which model
of competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) is best suited to describe the industry of interest?
This is an empirical question. As clearly articulated by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), these
two models should not be taken literally as resulting from a di¤erent choice of strategies
(price vs. quantity). Instead, they have to be interpreted as two reduced forms models for
27
the joint determination of prices and outputs. The choice between the two must be guided
by the best t to the data in the particular industry under study.
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A Quantity competition
A.1 Deterministic input cost (Lemma 1)
Condition 2 guarantees that @
2Ci
(@qi)
2 < 0. Thus, if an interior Cournot equilibrium exists, it is
characterized by the necessary rst-order conditions (3). Assumption 1 guarantees that, for
all c > 0, the equation
A (Q) = 2P (Q) +QP 0 (Q) = c
admits a unique solution QC (c). When the equilibrium is interior
 
qCi > 0 for i = 1; 2

, the
equilibrium quantities are:
qC (ci; cj) =
P
 
QC (ci + cj)
  ci
( P 0 (QC (ci + cj))) :
Finally, we verify that:
@qCi
@ci
=
@qC (ci; cj)
@ci
=
2P
0  
QC

+ qCj P
00  
QC

P 0 (QC)
 
3P 0 (QC) +QCP
00
(QC)
 < 0 (12)
and
@qCj
@ci
=
@qC (cj; ci)
@ci
=   P
0  
QC

+ qCi P
00  
QC

P 0 (QC)
 
3P 0 (QC) +QCP
00
(QC)
 > 0: (13)
A.2 Properties of the risk-adjusted expected cost (Lemma 2)
Note rst that for any variable x :
@bci
@x
=
E [U 0 (i)]E

U 00 (i) @i@x ~c
  E [U 0 (i) ~c]E U 00 (i) @i@x 
(E [U 0 (i)])2
= 
E
h
U 0 (i)

 U 00(i)
U 0(i)
@i
@x
~c
i
E [U 0 (i)]
+
E [U 0 (i) ~c]
E [U 0 (i)]
E
h
U 0 (i)

 U 00(i)
U 0(i)
@i
@x
i
E [U 0 (i)]
= bEi  (i) @i
@x
~c

+ bcibEi  (i) @i
@x

= bEi  (i) @i
@x
(bci   ~c) :
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For any (Hi; Hj), the equilibrium
 
qi ; q

j

(Hi; Hj) of the Cournot game satises
P
 
qi + q

j

+ qi P
0  
qi + q

j

= bc  qi ; qj ; Hi :
Thus, @
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi; ~c

= P
 
qi + q

j

+qi P
0  
qi + q

j
 ~c = bc  qi ; qj ; Hi ~c: Using the above
formula with x = qi;we obtain:
@bc
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= bEi h    qi ; qj ; Hi  bc  qi ; qj ; Hi  ~c2i > 0;
which establishes the rst part of (6).
Now
bci   F = E [U 0 (i) ~c]E [U 0 (i)]   E [~c] = cov [U
0 (i) ; ~c]
E [U 0 (i)]
Since (i) U 0 (:) is non-increasing in i, and (ii) i increases in ~c if and only if Hi > qi, we
have bci  F , Hi  qi.
Moreover, @i
@Hi
= (~c  F ), thus using again the above formula with x = Hi
@bci
@Hi
= bEi [ (i) (~c  F ) (bci   ~c)] =  bEi  (i) (~c  bci)2+ (bci   F ) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)]
= 
bEi  (i) (~c  bci)2+ cov [U 0 (i) ; ~c]  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]E [U 0 (i)]

Now bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] = bEi h (i)bEi [~c]  ~ci =  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] :
Since (:) is, like U 0(:); non-increasing in i, cov [U 0 (i) ; ~c] and ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] have the same
sign. Hence @bci
@Hi
< 0: This establishes the second part of (6).
Similar algebra yields
@bci
@qj
= bEi  (i) @i
@qj
(bci   ~c) = qiP 0 (Q) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] =  qiP 0 (Q) ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] :
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which establishes (7). (8) follows from (7).
A.3 Unicity of equilibrium (Proposition 2)
As mentioned in the main text, the equilibrium of the production game (q1; q

2) (H1; H2) is
unique if the real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian J (q1; q

2; H1; H2) are negative,
where
J (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
264 @qE1@q1   1 @qE1@q2
@qE2
@q1
@qE2
@q2
  1
375 :
This is an application of Lyapunov stability theorem (see for example Khalil (2002)). The
eigenvalues are the roots of 2   Tr + Det = 0;where Tr is the trace of J and Det its
determinant. The roots are:  = Tr
p
Tr2 4Det
2
. If Tr2   4Det < 0, the two roots are
complex and conjugate. Their real part is negative if and only if Tr < 0. If Tr2  4Det  0,
the two roots are real. Tr+
p
Tr2   4Det < 0 requires Tr < 0 and Det > 0. Thus, we have
to show that Tr < 0 and Det > 0. We have:
Tr =

@qC1
@q1
+
@qC2
@q2
  2

:
By denition, qCi = q
C (bc (qi; qj; Hi) ;bc (qj; qi; Hj) ; Hi) ;for i = 1; 2, thus
@qCi
@qi
=
@qCi
@ci
@bci
@qi
+
@qCi
@cj
@bcj
@qi
; (14)
and
@qCi
@qj
=
@qCi
@ci
@bci
@qj
+
@qCi
@cj
@bcj
@qj
: (15)
Thus, Tr = @q
C
1
@c1
@bc1
@q1
+
@qC1
@c2
@bc2
@q1
+
@qC2
@c2
@bc2
@q2
+
@qC2
@c1
@bc1
@q2
  2:
Lemma 2 shows that, when  is constant, @bc1
@q2
= @bc2
@q1
= 0: Thus
Tr (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
@qC1
@c1
 
@bc1
@q1
+
+
@qC2
@c2
 
@bc2
@q2
+
  2 <  2:
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We now examine Det (q1; q

2; H1; H2).
Det =

@qC1
@q1
  1

@qC2
@q2
  1

  @q
C
1
@q2
@qC2
@q1
=
@qC1
@q1
@qC2
@q2
  @q
C
1
@q2
@qC2
@q1
  @q
C
1
@q1
  @q
C
2
@q2
+ 1
Substituting @q
C
i
@qi
and @q
C
i
@qj
from equations (14) and (15), and simplifying yields
@qC1
@q1
@qC2
@q2
  @q
C
1
@q2
@qC2
@q1
=

@qC1
@c1
@qC2
@c2
  @q
C
1
@c2
@qC2
@c1

@bc1
@q1
@bc2
@q2
  @bc1
@q2
@bc2
@q1

:
Now, substituting in @q
C
i
@ci
and
@qCj
@ci
from equations (12) and (13), and simplifying yields
@qC1
@c1
@qC2
@c2
  @q
C
1
@c2
@qC2
@c1
=
1
P 0 (QE)
 
3P 0 (QE) +QP
00
(QE)
 :
Thus,
Det =
@bc1
@q1
@bc2
@q2
  @bc1
@q2
@bc2
@q1
P 0 (QC)
 
3P 0 (QC) +QCP
00
(QC)
   Tr   1:
Then, with  constant, we know that @bc2
@q1
= @bc1
@q2
= 0: Moreover, @bc1
@q1
< 0 and @bc2
@q2
< 0: Thus
Det >  Tr   1 > 1:
A.4 Impact ofHi on qj with constant absolute risk aversion (Propo-
sition 2)
Dene  (qi; qj; Hi) = P (Q)  bc (qi; qj; Hi) + qiP 0 (Q) :
The rst order conditions characterizing the unique equilibrium of the production game
can be written as  
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

=  
 
qj ; q

i ; Hj

= 0: Total di¤erentiation of these conditions
with respect to Hi yields:8><>:

 1
@qi
@Hi
+  2
@qj
@Hi
+  3
  
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0
 1
@qj
@Hi
+  2
@qi
@Hi
  
qj ; q

i ; Hj

= 0
;
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where 8>>>><>>>>:
 1 (qi; qj; Hi) = 2P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj) @bci@qi
 2 (qi; qj; Hi) = P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj)  @bci@qj
 3 (qi; qj; Hi) =   @bci@Hi > 0
:
The determinant of the above linear system is
 =  1
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

 1
 
qj ; q

i ; Hj
   2  qi ; qj ; Hi 2  qj ; qi ; Hj ;
thus 8><>:
@q
@Hi
(Hi; Hj) =   1(q

j ;q

i ;Hj)

 3
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

@q
@Hi
(Hj; Hi) =
 2(qj ;qi ;Hj)

 3
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi
 :
If  is constant, @bci
@qj
= 0, thus
 2 (qi; qj; Hi) = P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj)<0:
Then:
=

2P
0
(Q) + qi P
00
(Q) @bci
@qi

2P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q) @bcj
@qj

 

P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q)

P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q)

=

P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi

P
0
(Q) @bcj
@qj

+

P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi

P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q)

+

P
0
(Q) @bcj
@qj

P
0
(Q) + qi P
00
(Q)

:
Since all terms in parentheses are negative,  > 0. Thus
@qj
@Hi
=
@q
@Hi
(Hj; Hi) =
 2
 
qj ; q

i ; Hi


 3
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

< 0:
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B Price competition
Dene  (pi; pj; Hi) = @D@pi (pi; pj) (pi   bc (pi; pj; Hi)) +D (pi; pj) ; where
bci  bc (pi; pj; Hi)  E [U 0 ( (pi; pj; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (pi; pj; Hi; ~c))]
is the risk-adjusted expected cost of rm i. Suppose a unique interior equilibrium of the pric-
ing game (p1; p

2) (H1; H2) exists. The rst-order conditions characterizing this equilibrium
are
 
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

=  
 
pj ; p

i ; Hj

= 0:
Assuming  =  1
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

 1
 
pj ; p

i ; Hj
   2  pi ; pj ; Hi 2  pj ; pi ; Hj 6= 0;
8><>:
@pi
@Hi
= @p

@Hi
(Hi; Hj) =   1(p

j ;p

i ;Hj)

 3
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

@pj
@Hi
= @p

@Hi
(Hj; Hi) =
 2(pj ;pi ;Hj)

 3
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi
 ;
where 8>>>><>>>>:
 1 (pi; pj; Hi) = 2
@Di
@pi
+ (pi   bci) @2Di(@pi)2   @Di@pi @bci@pi
 2 (pi; pj; Hi) =
@Di
@pj
+ (pi   bci) @2Di@pi@pj   @Di@pi @bci@pj
 3 (pi; pj; Hi) =  @Di@pi @bci@Hi :
:
B.1 Impact of ci on pCi and p
C
j (constant input costs)
Suppose rst the marginal costs are constant:
 (pi; pj; ci) =
@D (pi; pj)
@pi
(pi   ci) +D (pi; pj)
and 8>>>><>>>>:
 1 (pi; pj; ci) = 2
@Di
@pi
+ (pi   ci) @2Di(@pi)2
 2 (pi; pj; ci) =
@Di
@pj
+ (pi   ci) @2Di@pi@pj
 3 (pi; pj; ci) =  @Di@pi
:
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Assumption 2 guarantees (i) existence and unicity of an equilibrium
 
pB (ci; cj) ; p
B (cj; ci)

,
(ii)  1 (pi; pj; ci) < 0, since 
B (pi; pj; ci) is concave in pi, (iii)  2
 
pB (ci; cj) ; p
B (cj; ci) ; ci

>
0, since prices are strategic complements, and (iv) ( 1 +  2)
 
pB (ci; cj) ; p
B (cj; ci) ; ci

< 0
since the own price e¤ect dominates. Thus
B =  1
 
pBi ; p
B
j ; ci

 1
 
pBj ; p
B
i ; cj
   2  pBi ; pBj ; ci 2  pBj ; pBi ; cj > 0
and 8>>><>>>:
@pBi
@ci
= @p
B
@ci
(ci; cj) =
@Di
@pi
 1(pBj ;pBi ;cj)
E
= @Di
@pi
2
@Dj
@pj
+(pj cj) @
2Dj
(@pj)
2
E
> 0
@pBj
@ci
= @p
B
@ci
(cj; ci) =  @Di@pi
 2(pBj ;pBi ;cj)
E
=  @Di
@pi
@Dj
@pi
+(pj cj) @
2Dj
@pi@pj
E
> 0
:
B.2 Properties of the risk-adjusted expected cost (Lemma 3)
For any (pi; pj; Hi) ; the same derivation as for Cournot competition yields:
@bci
@Hi
= bEi [ (i) (~c  F ) (bci   ~c)] =  bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2+ (bci   F ) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] :
= 
 bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2+ cov U 0 (i) ; ~c  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]E [U 0 (i)]
!
:
Since (i)  (:) and U
0
(:) are both non-increasing, and (ii) i increases in ~c if and only if
Hi > D (pi; pj), we have (i) cov

U
0
(i) ; ~c
  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]  0, thus @bci@Hi < 0, and (ii) andbci  F , Hi  D (pi; pj). Similarly,
@bci
@pj
= bEi  (i) @i
@pj
(bci   ~c) = @Di
@pj
bEi [ (i) (pi   ~c) (bci   ~c)]
=
@Di
@pj
n
(pi   bci) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] + bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2o :
Thus: @bc
@pj
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

= @Di
@pj

Di
@Di
@pi
ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] + bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2 : Then:
Hi > D
 
pi ; p

j
, ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] < 0) @bc
@pj
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

> 0:
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Finally:
@bci
@pi
= bEi  (i) @i
@pi
(bci   ~c) :
Then, @
@pi
=

(bci   ~c) @Di@pi   pi ; pj ; Hi and thus @bc@pi = @D@pi bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2 < 0.
C Strategic incentives to commit (Proposition 6)
C.1 Comparing S (C;NC) and S (NC;NC) when rms compete in
price
Suppose rm 2 plays NC, while rm 1 plays C. At t = 2, rm 2 chooses H2 = D (p2; p1),
after rms simultaneously select prices (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1)) that solve:8><>:D (p1; p2) + (p1   bc (p1; p2; H1))
@D
@p1
(p1; p2) = 0
D (p2; p1) + (p2   F ) @D@p2 (p2; p1) = 0
At t = 1, rm 1 selects H1 that maximizes Z (H1) = E [U ( (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1) ; H1))]. As
in the Cournot case, if rm 1 chooses H1 = D
 
pB (F; F ) ; pB (F; F )

= D0=2, p1 = p2 =
pB (F; F ) is a solution of the system, hence the unique equilibrium. The shareholder value
of both rms is S (NC;NC). Thus rm 1 can guarantee itself at least S (NC;NC),which
implies that S (C;NC)  S (NC;NC). To prove that the inequality is strict, it su¢ ces to
show that dZ
dH1
(D0=2) 6= 0: This is easy, since
dZ
dH1
(D0=2) =
@D1
@p2
 
pB (F; F )  F @p2
@H1
E
h
U
0
(1)
i
< 0:
Thus, if the rm hedges
 
D0
2
  " where " > 0 is arbitrarily small, it can obtain Z  D0
2
  " >
Z
 
D0
2

. Thus, S (C;NC) > S (NC;NC).
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C.2 Comparing S (C;C) and S (NC;NC) if rms compete in quan-
tity
S (C;C) = E

U

(P (Q)  F ) Q

2
+ (H  Q) (!   F )

< U

(P (Q)  F ) Q

2

since U (:) is concave, and
S (NC;NC) = U
  
P
 
2qC (F; F )
  F qC (F; F ) :
For x  0, denote f (x) = (P (2x)  F )x. Condition 2 implies that f (:) is globally concave
and admits a unique maximum x dened by f
0
(x) = P (2x) F +2xP 0 (2x) = 0. Then,
f
0  
qC (F; F )

=  qC (F; F )P 0  2qC (F; F )+2qC (F; F )P 0  2qC (F; F ) = qC (F; F )P 0  2qC (F; F ) < 0;
hence qE (F; F ) > x. Then, f
 
qE (F; F )

> f (q) since q > qE (F; F ) and f (:) is decreas-
ing for x  x. Thus: S(C;C) < U (f (q)) < U  f  qC (F; F ) = S (NC;NC) :
C.3 Hotelling competition
We have seen in the text that
S (C;C) =
t
2
[1 +
"(5 + 8"+ 3"2)
2(3 + 2")2
] >
t
2
= S (NC;NC) :
Suppose that rm 2 plays NC, while rm 1 plays C and chooses hedging H1. We
prove that S (C;C) > S (NC;C). The equilibrium prices (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1)) are given by the
Hotelling formula:
8><>:p1 = t+
1
3

2

F + 2

p2 p1
2t
+ 1
2
 H1

+ F

= t+ F + 4t"
3

p2 p1
2t
+ 1
2
 H1

p2 = t+
1
3

2F +

F + 2

p2 p1
2t
+ 1
2
 H1

= t+ F + 2t"
3

p2 p1
2t
+ 1
2
 H1
 :
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Taking the di¤erence, we obtain
p2   p1 =  
2t"
3

p2   p1
2t
+
1
2
 H1

thus
p2   p1 =  2t
"
3 + "

1
2
 H1

and
D1  H1 = p2   p1
2t
+
1
2
 H1 = 3
3 + "

1
2
 H1

:
Equilibrium prices are given by
p1   F = t
 
1 + 4"
3+"
 
1
2
 H1

p2   F = t
 
1 + 2"
3+"
 
1
2
 H1

Note that
@p2
@H1
=   2t"
3 + "
< 0:
Maximization of M1 over H1 yields:
1
2t
 
p1   F + 2 (H1  D1)
 @p2
@H1
  2 (H1  D1) = 0
or nally
1
2
 H1 = 3 + "
2 (9 + 4")
:
This implies that p2   F = t
 
1 + "
9+4"

and D (p2; p1) =
1
2
 
1 + "
9+4"

:Thus
S (NC;C) =

1 +
"
9 + 4"
2
t
2
:
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Finally,
S (C;C) > S (NC;C)() 1 + "(5 + 8"+ 3"
2)
2(3 + 2")2
> 1 +
9"(2 + ")
(9 + 4")2
()
(5 + 8"+ 3"2) (9 + 4")2 > 18(2 + ")(3 + 2")2
which is veried for all "  0.
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Abstract
This article examines how rms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market
power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing
strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy
retailing, where risk averse rms decide on their hedging strategies before their product
market strategies. We nd that hedging modies the pricing and production strategies
of rms. This strategic e¤ect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e.,
the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders risk
aversion. It has opposite e¤ects depending on the nature of product market competition:
hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, if rms
can decide not to commit on their hedging position, this can never be an equilibrium outcome:
committing is always a best response to non committing. In the Hotelling model, committing
is a dominant strategy for all rms.
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1 Introduction
Most formal analyses of corporate risk management decisions consider price-taking rms that
face volatile cash ows. For example, small rms producing commodities or raw materials
(e.g., metals and minerals, oil and gas, electric power) face output price volatility. They can
use derivatives contracts to hedge against uctuations of the output prices. This standard,
"non-strategic" risk management logic also applies to rms facing input price volatility,
provided they do not exert market power in either their input or product markets.
However, when rms facing input price volatility have some degree of market power in
their product market, their strategies become more elaborate. A rms hedging modies its
realized input cost, hence its product market strategy. Thus, the rm alters the competitive
dynamics in its industry, and must take into account the behavior of its competitors.
This situation occurs in many industries. For example, electricity retailers purchase power
on wholesale markets and resell it to their retail customers. In Britain, the electricity and
gas regulatory agency (Ofgem (2008), page 10) indicates that: "there is evidence that the
(6 largest suppliers) seek to benchmark their hedging strategies against each other in order
to minimize the risk of their wholesale costs diverging materially from the competition".
Suppliers thus appear to include their competitorshedging strategy in their own hedging
strategy, and ultimately their product market strategy.
Airlines also constitute a relevant example. Carter et al. (2006) report that, over the
period 1992   2003, fuel price represented more than 13% of airlines operating costs, and
exhibited annualized volatility of 27%. Airlines do not exert market power in the fuel market,
yet they are an oligopoly on specic routes (see for example Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)).
The food processing industry provides another example. Food processing rms are ex-
posed to volatile feedstock prices (e.g., grains, tobacco). They may not exert market power
in the feedstock markets, however most empirical studies document market power in their
product markets: see for example the survey by Sheldon and Sperling (2001).
As the examples above suggest, the interaction between hedging and product market
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strategies is relevant for multiple industries. Yet, the academic literature on the strategic
aspects of hedging is small, for, in most cases, a separation (or dichotomy) property exists:
hedging is found to have no impact on product market strategy (see for example the references
in Dionne and Santugini (2013)). This article is among the few that explicitly establishes a
link between hedging and product market strategy when rms compete in quantity (Cournot)
and in price (di¤erentiated Bertrand).
We focus the analysis on risk-averse rms that hedge before deciding their product market
strategies. The empirical relevance of this choice is justied in Section 3. Formally, we use
two-stage games: rms rst determine their hedging strategy, then determine their product
market strategy (quantity or price), conditional on their rst-stage choice.
We rst analyze quantity competition. We prove that the rst-order conditions charac-
terizing the equilibrium of the (second-stage) production game are similar to the standard
Cournot case, except that risk-adjusted expected costs replace marginal costs. The intuition
is that investors value a marginal cost increase using the probability measure induced by
their marginal utility of wealth in each state of the world, and not the physical probability
measure. This risk-adjusted expected marginal cost is determined in equilibrium, and is
decreasing in own hedging. Thus, a rm that increases its hedging becomes more aggressive
(Lemma 2).
An equilibrium of the production game always exists. If rmsabsolute risk aversion is
constant (or does not vary too much), this equilibrium is unique, and an increase in own
hedging reduces the other rms equilibrium output (Proposition 2). If a symmetric equilib-
rium of the (rst-stage) hedging game exists, hedging toughens quantity competition: rms
hedge more than their (anticipated) equilibrium production, thus committing to produce
more than if their costs were constant and equal to the expected cost under the physical
probability measure (Proposition 3).
We establish similar results for price competition, although we reach the opposite con-
clusion: hedging softens price competition. As with quantity competition, risk-adjusted
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expected marginal costs, determined in equilibrium, replace constant marginal costs in the
rst-order conditions characterizing the equilibrium of the pricing game. Since risk-adjusted
expected costs are decreasing in own hedging, a rm that increases its hedging becomes more
aggressive (Lemma 3).
As with quantity competition, an equilibrium of the pricing game always exists. If ab-
solute risk aversion is constant, the equilibrium is unique, and an increase in own hedging
reduces the other rms equilibrium price. The crucial di¤erence with quantity competition
is that hedging softens pricing competition: rms hedge less than their (anticipated) equi-
librium production, thus committing to a price higher than if their cost was constant and
equal to the expected cost under the physical probability measure (Proposition 5).
Finally, we examine the strategic incentives to commit to a hedging position (Proposition
6). The above results are derived under the assumption that Boards of Directors impose that
rms commit to their hedging position. This is usually meant to limit speculation by traders.
Ignoring that objective, does commitment arise in equilibrium?
We show that, whether rms compete in quantity or in price, committing is a rms
best response to the other not committing. Thus universal non commitment never arises
as an equilibrium. Furthermore, in the particular case of the Hotelling model (where rms
compete in price and total demand is inelastic) commitment is a dominant strategies for all
rms.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the links with the literature.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes quantity competition. Section 5 analyzes
price competition. Section 6 examines incentives to commit to hedging decisions. Technical
proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
As mentioned previously, only a few articles examine the interaction between hedging and
product market strategies. They are reviewed below.
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Dionne and Santugini (2013) examine a two-stage game related to ours. In the rst
stage, rms decide to enter the market (or not). In the second stage, risk averse rms facing
a volatile input price compete à la Cournot in their output market, and simultaneously
determine their hedging strategy. As they solve the game backwards, Dionne and Santugini
(2013) nd that both hedging and product market strategies depend on the number of rms in
the market. The latter is then determined in equilibrium, and is a function of the volatility
of input price, the level of forward prices, and rms risk aversion. There are two main
di¤erences with our model: we consider a mature market where the number of active rms
is xed, while Dionne and Santugini (2013) look at markets where new rms can enter. The
second di¤erence is that in our model rms commit ex ante to their hedging strategies (more
on this in the next section) while in Dionne and Santugini (2013) hedging and quantities are
jointly determined: rms use hedging as a strategic commitment device in our model, while
they use market entry in Dionne and Santugini (2013).
Allaz and Villa (1993) look at rms that are large enough to exert market power on both
the spot and the forward markets. There is no uncertainty. In the spot market (stage 2), a
rm that has already sold a share of its output faces lower incentives to withhold output. In
the forward market (stage 1), rms face a prisoner dilemma, and cannot resist selling output
forward. Thus the existence of forward contracts reduces rmsmarket power. This result
is very similar to our Proposition 6, even though the setting is di¤erent: rms in Allaz and
Villa sell output in spot and forward markets where they exert market power, while in ours,
rms exert no market power in the spot and forward markets for input.
Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) examine two-period games in the presence of nan-
cial constraints: rmshedging decision in the rst-period a¤ects their investment capacity,
hence their protability in the second period. They show that asymmetric equilibria arise:
in equilibrium, some rms hedge, while others do not. In their model, the presence of -
nancial constraints and the resulting potential underinvestment is the conduit for strategic
interaction. Similarly, Loss (2012) examines the interaction between hedging demand and
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the characteristics of investment opportunities in the presence of nancial constraints. Us-
ing a reduced form for prot functions, he nds that a rms hedging demand is high when
investments are strategic substitutes, and low when they are strategic complements. In this
article, by contrast, prices and outputs are endogenized together with hedging positions.
Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002) consider a duopoly with asymmetric exposure to an
exchange rate, and determine the optimal pass-through and related exposure. While the
problem is related to the one examined here, the analytical approach is very di¤erent: they
treat the exchange rate as a xed input price, not as a stochastic variable. Recently, Nocke
and Thanassoulis (forthcoming) examine how credit constraints, making rms endogenously
risk averse, impact vertical relationships in the supply chain. They nd that, in the short
run, the optimal supply contract involves risk sharing and double marginalization.
This article also is methodologically related to the literature on the strategic impact of
rmsnancial structure1, that was initiated by Brander and Lewis (1986). Brander and
Lewis (1986) examine a two stage game. In the rst stage, rms determine their debt level.
In the second stage, they compete à la Cournot, facing uncertainty on their protability.
Brander and Lewis (1986) nd that, in the states of the world where marginal protability
is higher, an increase in debt increases the equilibrium output, which echoes our Proposition
2. They also nd that the equilibrium level of debt is excessive from the industrys point of
view, which echoes our Proposition 6.
Our analytical approach, namely the use of two-stage games, is identical to Brander
and Lewis (1986). However, we examine a di¤erent decision by rms: hedging and not
capital structure. Specically, we show that rms can use risk management as a strategic
instrument, as powerful as debt.
1A review of this literature can be found in Tirole (2006), Chapter 7.
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3 Quantity Competition: the Model
Consider two identical rms, indexed by i = 1; 2, competing à la Cournot. Firm i produces qi
units of output, total production is Q = q1+ q2, and inverse demand P (Q). The technology
is linear: each unit of input, that costs ~c, is transformed into one unit of output. Firm is
commercial prot is thus:
C (qi; qj; ~c) = qi (P (Q)  ~c) :
3.1 Uncertainty on input costs and risk management
Ex ante, the input cost ~c is a random variable, with a cumulative distribution function G (:)
on a bounded support. Firms can hedge some of their risk on input cost ~c by buying forward
contracts at (unit) price F . To eliminate speculative motives for hedging, we assume that
F = E [~c]. There are no transaction costs associated with hedging. Thus, at t = 2 (i.e., once
the input cost ~c is known), the prot function of rm i that has purchased forward quantity
Hi at price F is:
i= (qi; qj; Hi; ~c) = qi (P (Q)  ~c) +Hi (~c  F )
= qi (P (Q)  F )  (qi  Hi) (~c  F ) :
The rst expression for rm i0s prot corresponds to adding to its commercial prot the
net gain (or loss) on its forward position Hi. The second expression shows an equivalent
decomposition: rm i can consider that its production cost is F , and its net (unhedged)
exposure to input price uctuations (qi  Hi).
Firms do not have market power in the spot and forward markets for input, even though
they do exert market power in their product market. We also assume that rms choose their
outputs (or prices) before input costs are realized. This is the case for most manufacturing
industries2: producers (e.g., car manufacturers) commit to a product price or volume for
2This assumption does not apply to industries where output price is exible. For example delivery services
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the relevant period (typically one or two quarters). During that period, input prices (e.g.,
aluminum and steel prices) vary. This assumption also holds for the electricity supply in-
dustry. For example in the United Kingdom, electricity retail rates typically change only 3
or 4 times a year, while wholesale power prices vary continuously.
Two other assumptions are crucial for risk management to have any strategic value. First,
each rm must be able to publicly commit to its hedging decision. Second, rms must be
"risk averse", in the sense that shareholder value can be measured by the expectation of
some concave function of prot. We now motivate these assumptions.
3.2 Public commitment to the hedging decision
Except for Section 6, we assume throughout this article that rms publicly commit to their
hedging decisions (H1; H2) before they select their output (or prices). This assumption can
be justied as follows.
First, nancial regulations require rms to publish, in their quarterly statements, a de-
scription of their portfolio of forward purchases and sales. While some discretion still exists
in disclosure, an outside party can get a close picture of a rms hedging portfolio. For
example, Jin and Jorion (2007) were able to compute the delta-equivalent of the forward
portfolio for US oil and gas companies. Also, as previously mentioned, electricity suppliers
in Britain infer each others hedging portfolio from nancial statements and other public
information.
Second, industrial rms can and in practice do commit to a hedging strategy through
their risk management policy. Forward sales and purchases, that require the use of deriv-
atives, are usually handled with extreme caution by Board of Directors, concerned about
(e.g., Fedex and UPS) explicitly include in their published rate a fuel surcharge schedule, that depends on
the price of an oil index. Similarly, electricity suppliers in Norway o¤er retail contracts explicitly adjusted
to the wholesale power price.
When rms set production after the input price is realized, the prot from the hedge is known before
the production decision is made, thus has no impact on it. Firms cannot do any better than standard
deterministic prot maximization. Knowing that, when rms make the hedging decision, they follow the
"standard" non-strategic risk management logic.
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potential speculative behavior by traders. Boards then require management to dene and
follow a clear hedging strategy. As mentioned earlier, this position is communicated to
investors and regulators. Management has then limited discretion to deviate from it.
Without commitment on hedging, no strategic interaction would arise and there would
be a dichotomy between hedging and production. Suppose indeed that rms select output,
then hedge. Reasoning backwards, consider rst the hedging decision, once production is
known. Since (i) rms are risk averse, and (ii) there are no transaction costs nor expected
gain from hedging (i.e., E [~c]   F = 0), full hedging is the optimal strategy. Consider now
the production decision. Knowing that input costs will be perfectly covered at the forward
price, rms play a symmetric Cournot game with constant marginal costs equal to F . The
same reasoning holds for price competition.
Thus, this article is focussed on situations where risk-averse rms hedge before making
their production (or price) decision.
3.3 Objective function
To obtain a strategic impact of risk management, a crucial ingredient is that rms be risk-
averse. Thus, we assume that each rm i maximizes some expected utility U (i) of its
prots i, where U (:) is increasing, concave and exhibits non-increasing absolute risk aversion
()   U 00
U 0 (). This is a natural assumption when the rm is owned by a small number of
shareholders who cannot fully diversify. This is also a convenient reduced form for widely
held rms when there are nancial frictions3. These nancial frictions can take the form
of a wedge between the costs of external and internal nance (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein
(1993)), transaction costs on primary security markets (Décamps et al. (2011)), or agency
costs (DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais et al. (2007)). In each of these cases, shareholder
3If nancial markets were complete and frictionless, the Modigliani and Miller theorem would apply. In
particular risk management would not create any value for shareholders.
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value can be represented as the expectation of a concave function4 of future prots. For
simplicity, we consider a symmetric model where U (:) is the same for all rms. At date
t = 0, the shareholder value of rm i is then
vi = v (qi; qj; Hi) = E [U ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))] = E [U (qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F ))] :
We look for subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game played by rms. We use
backward induction: we rst determine the second-stage equilibrium (q (H1; H2) ; q (H2; H1)),
and then compute the rst-stage payo¤functions Vi = V (Hi; Hj)  vi(q (Hi; Hj) ; q (Hj; Hi) ; Hi).
4 Strategic use of hedging
4.1 An illustrative example
Before turning to the general Cournot model, we illustrate the main insights with a simple
example: (i) Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), i.e. U (x) = 1   exp ( x), (ii)
linear inverse demand P (Q) = 1   Q, and (iii) normally distributed5 input cost ~c, with
mean F and standard deviation . In this case,
v (qi; qj; Hi) = E [1  exp (  (qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F )))] = 1 exp ( m (qi; qj; Hi))
where
mi = m (qi; qj; Hi) = qi (1 Q  F )   (Hi   qi)
2 2
2
is the certainty equivalent of rm i0s prot. Maximizing vi is equivalent to maximizing mi.
Now
@mi
@qi
= 1  2qi   qj   F + 2 (Hi   qi) :
First note that @mi
@qi
is decreasing in qi (which means that mi is concave in qi) and in qj
4We take U as exogenous. A fully dynamic model, with explicit modelling of nancial frictions, would
allow to endogenize U . This is done by Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) in a non-strategic context. Extending
it to a strategic context would be di¢ cult and is outside the scope of the present paper.
5Assuming normal distributions has the usual drawback that costs can take arbitrarily large (or negative)
values, and thus equilibrium prices or quantities can be negative, which of course is meaningless from the
economic viewpoint. However, for reasonable values of the parameters, the probability of negative prices
and quantities is essentially zero, and our equilibria are essentially identical to the fully correct ones that
would have been obtained with appropriately truncated normal distributions.
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(which means that quantities are strategic substitutes: rm i produces less if its competitor
produces more). Note again that if hedging Hi was determined simultaneously with output
qi; rms would choose complete hedging Hi = qi and we would be back to the Cournot model
with deterministic cost F . Thus our assumption that hedging is determined before output
is decided is crucial for risk management to play any strategic role.
The rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions characterizing the equilibrium are
qi
 
2 + 2

+ qj = 1  F + 2Hi (i = 1; 2); (1)
which yields the unique equilibrium of the second-stage game:
qi = q
 (Hi; Hj) =
1  F + 2
1+2
[(2 + 2)Hi  Hj]
3 + 2
(i = 1; 2):
Thus V (Hi; Hj) = 1  exp ( M (Hi; Hj)), where
Mi =M (Hi; Hj) = m (q
 (Hi; Hj) ; q (Hj; Hi) ; Hi) ;
is the certainty equivalent of rm i0s prot in the production game (stage 1). Now6,
@Mi
@Hi
=
@mi
@qi
@qi
@Hi
+
@mi
@qj
@qj
@Hi
+
@mi
@Hi
=

qi P
0
(Q)
@qj
@Hi
  (Hi   qi ) 2

= 2[Hi  

1 +
1
(3 + 2) (1 + 2)

qi ]:
The necessary rst-order conditions of the hedging game (stage 1) are then:
Hi =

1 +
1
(3 + 2) (1 + 2)

qi (i = 1; 2):
Since M is concave in its rst argument, these conditions are also su¢ cient. Replacing qi
6Note that @mi@qi = 0 by the equilibrium condition of the second-stage game.
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by q (Hi; Hj) and solving for the rst stage equilibrium yields a unique solution, which is
symmetric (qi = q

j = q
; Hi = H

j = H
), characterized by
H = q(1 +
1
(3 + 2) (1 + 2)
) > q; and q =
1  F
3  2
(3+2)(1+2)
>
1  F
3
:
Note that 1 F
3
would be the equilibrium output of each rm in the absence of commitment
on hedging. These results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that rms compete in quantities, have a constant absolute risk aver-
sion, demand is linear, and costs are normally distributed. Then the two-stage game has a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which is symmetric. Firms over hedge and produce more
than in the absence of commitment on hedging.
Thus, with our simple specication, committing ex-ante on their hedging positions makes
Cournot competitors more aggressive. If hedging was done after (or together with) output
decisions, shareholders would be collectively better-o¤: prices and prots would be higher
and rms would be perfectly hedged against input price uctuations7. As we now see, these
features also hold under more general conditions on utility, demand, and cost distribution.
4.2 The general case
In order to extend the analysis to a more general specication, we rst need to guarantee
the existence and unicity of a Cournot equilibrium in the second stage of the game, for any
couple of hedging strategies (Hi; Hj) of the rst stage. For this we impose classical conditions
that give existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium when rms have di¤erent costs
(see for example Vives (2001)).
7However, we show in Section 6 that it is never privately optimal for the shareholders of each of the rms
not to commit on their hedging positions. This is a prisonersdilemma type of situation.
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Assumption 1 For all Q  0, the inverse demand function P (:) satises
QP 00 (Q)
( P 0 (Q)) < 1 (2)
and
lim
Q!1
A (Q) = 0 and lim
Q!0
A (Q) = lim
Q!0
P (Q) = +1
where
A (Q) = 2P (Q) +QP
0
(Q) :
Under Assumption 1 the Cournot game with deterministic (but di¤erent) costs (ci; cj)
has natural properties that we will use in the sequel. In this game, rm is prot function
is:
C (qi; qj; ci) = qi (P (Q)  ci) :
Thus:
@Ci
@qi
= (P (Q)  ci) + qiP 0 (Q) = 0; (3)
and
@2Ci
(@qi)
2 = 2P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q) :
Lemma 1 Assumption 1 implies that, for all (c1; c2) there exists a unique Cournot equilib-
rium
 
qC (c1; c2) ; q
C (c2; c1)

. When this equilibrium is interior
 
qCi = q
C (ci; cj) > 0 for i = 1; 2

,
it satises @q
C
i
@ci
< 0 and
@qCj
@ci
> 0 for i = 1; 2.
Proof. The result is standard. For the readers convenience, the proof is presented in
Appendix A.1.
Thus, an increase in rm i0s marginal cost induces a reduction in its Cournot equilibrium
output qCi and an increase in the equilibrium output of its competitor q
C
j . This property will
be crucial for our results.
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We now return to the random cost case. The shareholder value of rm i is
vi = E [U (i)] = E [U (qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F ))] ;
and thus
@vi
@qi
=E

U 0 (i)
@i
@qi

= E
h
U 0 (i)

P (Q)  ~c+ qiP 0 (Q)
i
=E [U 0 (i)]

P (Q) + qiP
0
(Q)  bc (qi; qj; Hi) ;
where
bc  bc(qi; qj; Hi) = E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))] = F + cov [U
0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c)) ; ~c]
E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))]
(4)
is the risk-adjusted expected cost8 of rm i. Note that v (qi; qj; Hi) is concave in qi since
@2vi
(@qi)
2 = E
"
U
00
(i)

@i
@qi
2
+ U
0
(i)
@2i
(@qi)
2
#
< 0:
Therefore, if an interior Nash equilibrium
 
qi ; q

j

exists, it is determined by the rst order
conditions
P (Q) + qi P
0
(Q)  bc  qi ; qj ; Hi = 0; (i = 1; 2): (5)
Before proving existence of a Nash equilibrium and deriving su¢ cient conditions for unic-
ity, we examine system (5). The interaction between hedging and production is channelled
through the expected risk-adjusted cost bc (qi; qj; Hi), determined in equilibrium. If rm i pro-
duces one more unit at random cost ~c; the impact on shareholder value is E [U 0 (i) ~c] . More
generally, the marginal certainty equivalent of a random cash ow x (~c) for the shareholders
8The notion of risk-adjusted expectation is borrowed from mathematical nance, where it is used in
particular to price derivative contracts.
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of rm i is given by its risk-adjusted expectation:
bEi [x (~c)] = E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))x (~c)]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))] :
For example in the case of constant absolute risk aversion and normal distribution of
costs, the risk adjusted expected cost of rm i does not depend on its competitor output.
It is just equal to the expected cost F plus a risk premium that increases linearly with
unhedged output9 (qi  Hi) :
bc(qi; Hi)  E [U 0 (i) ~c]E [U 0 (i)] = F + 2 (qi  Hi)
It is increasing in qi, decreasing in Hi, and lower than the expected cost F if and only if
Hi > qi. When rmsabsolute risk aversion () =
 U 00()
U 0() is not constant, bci also depends
on the output of the other rm, which complicates the analysis10: bci  bc(qi; qj; Hi): However
the properties derived above are robust:
Lemma 2 :
@bc
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi
  0; and @bci
@Hi
< 0: (6)
bci  F , Hi  qi:
@bci
@qj
=  qiP 0 (Q) ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] ; (7)
thus 8><>:
@bci
@qj
= 0 if  () is constant
@bci
@qj
< 0, Hi > qi if  () is decreasing
: (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
9This can be seen by computing vi = E[U(i)] = U(mi) in two di¤erent ways:
@Ui
@Hi
= E[U 0(i) @i@Hi ] = E[U
0(i)(ec  F )] = E[U 0(i)][bci   F ] and
@Ui
@Hi
= U 0(mi)@mi@Hi = E[U
0(i)]2(qi  Hi):
10Dependency of bci with respect to qj is indirect. It is channelled through variations in absolute risk
aversion.
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At equilibrium, expected risk-adjusted marginal cost increases in qi as if there were
decreasing returns to scale. Increasing Hi reduces rm i0s risk-adjusted expected marginal
cost. This comes from the fact that a marginal increase in hedging decreases ex-post marginal
cost when ~ci > F and increases it when ~ci < F . Since favorable realizations are weighted by
a lower marginal utility, overall the risk-adjusted expected cost decreases.
We now turn to existence and unicity of the equilibrium of the production game. Since
we ultimately focus on symmetric equilibria (where H1 = H

2 = H, q

1 = q

2 = q
, bc1 = bc2),
we restrict our attention to the case where jH1  H2j is small enough that the equilibrium
of the production game is interior.
(q1; q

2) is thus a xed point of the function , dened from R2 into R2 by8><>:1 (q1; q2) = q
C (bc (q1; q2; H1) ;bc (q2; q1; H2))
2 (q1; q2) = q
C (bc (q2; q1; H2) ;bc (q1; q2; H1)) :
Proposition 2 For any (H1; H2) close enough to the diagonal, an equilibrium of the pro-
duction game exists. If absolute risk aversion is constant, this equilibrium is unique, and
denoted11 by qi = q
 (Hi; Hj) for i = 1; 2: Furthermore, a marginal increase in rm is
hedging reduces rm js equilibrium output:
@qj
@Hi
< 0:
Proof. For existence, we apply Brouwers xed point theorem to the mapping . Since by
assumption ec is bounded above by some constant c;
bc (qi; qj; Hi) = E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj; Hi; ~c))]  c
for all (qi; qj; Hi). Now, since
@qC
@cj
(ci; cj)  0 and @qC@ci (ci; cj)  0:
qC (bc (qi; qj; Hi) ;bc (qj; qi; Hj))  qC (0; c)  qC :
Thus, we can limit our search to (qi; qj) 2

0; qC
2
. Since qC (x; y) and bc (x; y; :) are contin-
11Unicity of the equilibrium and symmetry of the game imply symmetry of the equilibrium.
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uous in (x; y), and dened on a compact and convex set of R2, Brouwers theorem implies
the existence of an equilibrium.
If absolute risk aversion is constant, we prove in Appendix A.3 that the real parts of the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
J (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
264 @qC1@q1   1 @qC1@q2
@qC2
@q1
@qC2
@q2
  1
375
are always negative, which implies that the equilibrium is unique. Finally, constant absolute
risk aversion also implies @bc
@qj
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0 by Lemma 2. Firms play a familiar Cournot
game with marginal costs bci increasing in qi at the equilibrium, and decreasing in Hi. We
prove in Appendix A.4 that, since increasing hedging reduces a rms cost, it makes it more
aggressive, and reduces its competitors output.
Proposition 2 shows that a marginal increase inHi reduces qj , and thus increases q

i , since
quantities are strategic substitutes. Another way to see this is that a marginal increase in Hi
reduces the risk-adjusted expected cost, because it decreases the unhedged input (qi  Hi) ;
and thus increases qi . Thus a marginal increase in Hi commits rm i to a higher output.
If risk aversion varies with prot, a "revenue e¤ect" arises. Equilibrium of the quantity
game may not always be unique. However, this e¤ect is of second-order importance if risk
aversion does not vary too much, and our basic conclusions remain valid12.
4.3 Equilibrium of the hedging game
Suppose a symmetric interior equilibrium of the hedging game (H; H) exists. Then we
have:
Proposition 3 1. H is characterized by the rst-order condition:
bc (q; q; H)  F + P 0 (Q) q @qj
@Hi
(H; H) = 0: (9)
12Proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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2. If absolute risk aversion is constant, hedging toughens quantity competition: rms over-
hedge (H > q), and produce more than if they did not commit to their hedging
position: q > qC (F; F ) :
Proof.
1. For i = 1; 2 ,the rst-order conditions characterizing equilibrium hedging volumes Hi
are:
E

U 0 (i )

@i
@Hi
+
@i
@qj
@qj
@Hi
+
@i
@qi
@qi
@Hi

= 0:
Since @i
@Hi
= ~c   F , @i
@qj
= P
0
(Q) qi, and @@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0 by denition of qi , this
condition becomes
E[U 0 (i )

~c  F + P 0 (Q) qi
@qj
@Hi

] = 0:
Dividing by E [U 0 (i )] > 0 and setting H

i = H

j = H
 yields equation (9).
2. Since
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0, equation (9) yields bc (q; q; H) < F , H > q:Thus, at a
symmetric equilibrium, equation (5) yields
P (2q) + qP
0
(2q) = bc (q; q; H) < F = P  2qC (F; F )+ qC (F; F )P 0  2qC (F; F ) :
Assumption 2 implies that P (2q) + qP
0
(2q) is decreasing:

P (2q) + qP
0
(2q)
0
=
3P 0 (2q) + qP 00(2q) = [ P 0][ qP 00 P 0   3] < 0. Thus the above condition is equivalent
to q > qC (F; F ) :
A marginal increase in Hi has two e¤ects on rm is expected utility. First, a direct e¤ect
on expected cost : the rm substitutes input at known cost F for input at uncertain cost
~c. When taking the risk-adjusted expectation, this substitution is worth bc (qi; qj; Hi)   F .
Second, an indirect e¤ect, through the change in the other rms production: P
0
(Q) qi
@qj
@Hi
.
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At equilibrium, both e¤ects exactly cancel out for both rms, which produces equilibrium
conditions (9).
Thus, since
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0 and P
0
(Q) qi < 0, rms set bc  qi ; qj ; Hi  < F . They
over hedge, i.e., hedge more than their (anticipated) production, so that their risk-adjusted
expected marginal cost is lower than their "physical" expected marginal cost E [~c] = F . This
leads them to become more aggressive, and produce more than if they were perfectly hedged.
Finally, combining rst-order conditions (5) and (9) yields:
P (Q) + qP
0
(Q) = F   P 0 (Q) q @q

j
@Hi
(H; H) ; (i = 1; 2) :
Comparing with rst-order condition (3) for ci = F , an additional term

 P 0 (Q) q @qj
@Hi
< 0

is added, that captures the strategic impact of rm is hedging on rm js production de-
cision. Since this term is negative, each rm will be "tougher" in the second-stage. In the
subgame perfect equilibrium, rms "invest" too much in hedging, in order to be tough in
the quantity game13.
5 Price competition
We now turn to price competition. As in the previous Section, we analyze the subgame
perfect equilibria of a two-stage game. In the rst stage, rms choose their hedging positions
(Hi;Hj): In the second stage, they compete in prices. We will show that the strategic impact
of hedging on price competition is exactly opposite to the one it has on quantity competition.
Since the method of resolution is similar in both cases, results are stated briey. We only
emphasize the di¤erences with quantity competition. As in the previous Section, we start
by illustrating the basic properties on a simple case.
13This is reminiscent of the "top dog e¤ect" in the taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
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5.1 An illustrative example
Consider a standard Hotelling model, where the demand faced by rm i is Di = D (pi; pj) =
1
2
+
pj pi
2t
. The prot functions are
i=

1
2
+
pj   pi
2t

(pi   ~c) +Hi (~c  F )
=

1
2
+
pj   pi
2t

(pi   F ) + (Hi   1
2
+
pj   pi
2t
) (~c  F ) :
Shareholder value of rm i is vi = v (pi; pj; Hi) = E [U (i)]. If absolute risk aversion 
is constant and costs are normally distributed with mean F and standard deviation , the
certainty equivalent of rm is prot is
mi = (
1
2
+
pj   pi
2t
)(pi   F )  
2
2
(Hi   1
2
  pj   pi
2t
)2:
Note again that if hedging was selected simultaneously with price, each rm would hedge
completely and we would be back to the Hotelling model with deterministic costs F: The
situation is di¤erent here since rms commit on their hedging positions before competing in
prices. We have:
@mi
@pi
=
1
2
+
pj   pi
2t
+
F   pi
2t
  
2
2t
(Hi   1
2
  pj   pi
2t
):
@mi
@pi
is decreasing in pi (indicating that mi is concave in pi) and increasing in pj (indicating
that prices are strategic complements: rm i charges a higher price if rm j does). Intro-
ducing the notation 
2
2t
= ", the rst order condition characterizing the price equilibrium
is
pi = F + t+ "t[1  2Hi]  (1 + ")(pj   pi); (i = 1; 2):
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Taking the di¤erence between these two equations and simplifying, we obtain
pi   pj = 2"t
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi);
and thus
pi  p(Hi; Hj) = F + t+ "t[1  2Hi  
2(1 + ")
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi)]; (i = 1; 2):
To compute the certainty equivalentMi of rm i0s prot in the hedging game, we replace
pi by its expression in the formula giving mi. We obtain:
Mi = t

1
2
  "
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi)

1 + "

1  2Hi   2(1 + ")
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi)

 "t

Hi   1
2
+
"
3 + 2"
(Hj  Hi)
2
:
Mi is quadratic in (Hi; Hj) and strictly concave in Hi: Thus, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium of the rst-stage game, characterized by the rst order conditions. It is easy to see
that this equilibrium is symmetric: Hi = H

j = H
, where Hsatises: 1  2H = 1+"
3+2"
> 0:
Compared with the case where rms would hedge perfectly, equilibrium price and share-
holder value are higher:
pi = p

j = F + t+ "t
1 + "
3 + 2"
> F + t:
Mi =M

j =
t
2
[1 +
"(5 + 8"+ 3"2)
2(3 + 2")2
] >
t
2
:
These results are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 4 In the Hotelling model with normally distributed costs and constant absolute
risk aversion, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. It is symmetric (Hi = H

j = H
;
pi = p

j = p
): Firms under hedge (H < 1
2
), charge a higher price (p > F + t), and have
higher shareholder value than if they did not commit on hedging.
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Thus in the normal-Constant Absolute Risk Aversion case, commitment on risk manage-
ment allows Hotelling rms to compete less aggressively and secure higher margins. As we
now see, these features also hold more generally for di¤erentiated Bertrand competition.
5.2 The general model
Consider the general case of two symmetric rms that compete in prices. Firm i faces
demand Di = D (pi; pj), decreasing in its own price and increasing in the other rms price.
As in the Cournot case, we make assumptions that ensure that the second stage game has
a unique interior equilibrium. These assumptions bear on the asymmetric Bertrand game
where rms have di¤erent costs ci and cj; and rms i prot function is
Bi = 
B (pi; pj; ci) = D (pi; pj) (pi   ci) :
Assumption 2 : D (pi; pj) is such that:
(i) B is concave in its rst argument: @
2B
(@pi)
2 < 0 for all (pi; pj; ci) ;
(ii) for all (ci; cj) close enough to the diagonal14, the pricing game has a unique interior
equilibrium
 
pB (ci; cj) ; p
B (cj; ci)

(iii) prices are strategic complements: @
2B
@pi@pj
> 0 ;and
(iv) the own price e¤ect on demand is stronger than the other rms price e¤ect: @Di
@pi
+
@Di
@pj
 0 and @2Di
(@pi)
2 +
@2Di
@pi@pj
 0 for all (pi; pj) :
Assumption 2 is met for example in the Hotelling model considered above. In this case
equilibrium prices are: pB (ci; cj) = t+
2ci+cj
2
:
Concavity of the objective function and strategic complementarity of prices are met by
many demand functions. Unicity of equilibrium with deterministic input costs is required to
establish unicity with stochastic input costs. We prove in Appendix B.1 that when the own
price e¤ect is stronger than the others price e¤ect, an increase in one rms cost increases
both prices: @p
B
@ci
(ci; cj) > 0 and
@pB
@ci
(cj; ci) > 0:
14As in the Cournot case, jc1   c2j must be small enough to avoid a corner equilibrium.
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5.3 Strategic hedging
As before, we assume that the shareholder value of each rm equals the expected utility of
its prot:
vi = v (pi; pj; Hi) = E [U (i)] = E[UfD (pi; pj) (pi   ec) +Hi(ec  F )g]:
Thus
@vi
@pi
= E

U 0 (i)
@i
@pi

= E

U 0 (i) 

Di + (pi   ~c) @Di
@pi

= E [U 0 (i)]

Di + (pi   bci) @Di
@pi

;
where
bci = bc (pi; pj; Hi)  E [U 0 ( (pi; pj; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (pi; pj; Hi; ~c))] = F + cov [U
0 () ; ~c]
E [U 0 ()]
is the risk-adjusted expected cost of rm i. We prove in Appendix B.2 that this risk-adjusted
expected cost has similar (but not identical) properties to the Cournot case:
Lemma 3 :
@bc
@pi
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi
  0; and @bci
@Hi
< 0:
bci  F , Hi  D (pi; pj) :
@bci
@pj
=
@Di
@pj
n
(pi   bci) bE [ (i) (bci   ~c)] + bE  (i) (bci   ~c)2o :
Since @
2vi
@p2i
= E

U 00 (i)

@i
@pi
2
+ U 0 (i) @
2i
@p2i

< 0; v (pi; pj; Hi) is concave in pi: Thus if
an interior Nash equilibrium of the pricing game (p1; p

2) (H1; H2) exists, it is characterized
by the system of necessary rst-order conditions:
 
pi   bc  pi ; pj ; Hi @D@pi  pi ; pj+D  pi ; pj = 0; (i = 1; 2): (10)
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As will be proven below, this equilibrium of the pricing game exists, and, under certain
conditions, is unique, hence of the form (p (Hi; Hj) ; p (Hj; Hi)). The expected value of rm
i for its shareholders is Vi = V (Hi; Hj) = v (p (Hi; Hj) ; p (Hj; Hi) ; Hi). The equilibrium
of the two-stage game is then characterized as follows:
Proposition 5 1. For any (Hi; Hj) close enough to the diagonal, there exists an interior
equilibrium (p1; p

2) (H1; H2) of the pricing game. It is characterized by system (10):
2. If absolute risk aversion is constant, this equilibrium is unique, and a marginal hedging
increase by rm i reduces rm js equilibrium price:
@pj
@Hi
< 0:
3. Any interior equilibrium
 
Hi ; H

j

of the hedging game satises
bc  pi ; pj ; Hi = F + @D@pj
 
pi ; p

j

@D
@pi
 
pi ; p

j
D  pi ; pj @pj@Hi  Hi ; Hj  ; (i = 1; 2): (11)
4. If a symmetric interior equilibrium exists, and absolute risk aversion is constant, hedg-
ing softens price competition: rms under-hedge in order to induce higher prices than
if marginal costs were constant and equal to F :
H < D (p; p) and p > pB (F; F ) :
Proof. The proof follows the steps of Propositions 2 and 3. The risk-adjusted costs are
bounded, thus the set in which we look for a xed point is compact and convex in R2. Since
all functions are continuous, Brouwers xed point theorem guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium. If absolute risk aversion is constant, then Assumption 2 guarantees unicity of
the equilibrium and allows to sign the direction of the strategic e¤ect. Equation (11) is derived
similarly to equation (9). Comparison of equations (11) and (10) shows that hedging softens
price competition. Detailed proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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Combining the rst-order conditions yields:
(p   F ) @Di
@pi
(p; p) +D (p; p)  @Di
@pj
(p; p)D (p; p)
@pj
@Hi
(H; H) = 0:
Hedging has indeed a strategic e¤ect, captured by the term
@pj
@Hi
. Keeping some input price
exposure uncovered commits rms to be less aggressive. This commitment then yields a
higher equilibrium price : p > pE (F; F ). The direction of the strategic e¤ect is reversed
compared to Cournot competition: here, rms under-hedge, hence the equilibrium price is
increased. This stark di¤erence is best understood by comparing the rst-order conditions
(after appropriate transformations):
bci   F + @i
@qj
@qj
@Hi
= 0;
in the Cournot case, and
bci   F + @Di@pj
( @Di
@pi
)
D
 
pi ; p

j
 @pj
@Hi
= 0
in the case of di¤erentiated Bertrand. In both cases, when rm i increases hedging, rm j
reduces her strategic variable (quantity or price). If rms compete in quantity, when rm
j increases output, this reduces rm is prot

@i
@qj
< 0

: Therefore, at the equilibrium,
rm i over-hedges to set her risk-adjusted expected cost below F , and thus becomes more
aggressive. Conversely, if rms compete in price, when rm j raises his price, this increases
the demand faced by rm i0s

@Di
@pj
> 0

, hence rm i under-hedges to set her risk-adjusted
expected cost above F , and thus becomes less aggressive.
6 Incentives to commit on a hedging position
We have argued that rms commit to their hedging strategy because their Boards of Directors
do not want them to speculate: risk managers are not allowed to signicantly deviate from
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their pre-announced hedging position. This restriction has clear advantages in terms of
monitoring the activity of traders. However, we have seen that it is not always protable for
shareholders. In this Section, we set aside governance problems, and assume that rms are
free to decide ex-ante whether or not they want to commit to the hedging positions. This is
done by adding a prior stage to our sequential games.
The timing is now as follows: at t = 0, each rm decides either to Commit (C) or Not
Commit (NC) to its hedging position. At t = 1, rms that have chosen C publicly announce
their hedging position. At t = 2, rms compete (in quantities or in prices), and the rms
that have chosen (NC) decide on their hedging position. Finally, at t = 3, input cost is
realized, and prots are determined. We assume that there is a unique sub-game perfect
equilibrium at t = 1; independently of the commitments decisions made at t = 0 (this is the
case for example if rms have constant absolute risk aversion). The shareholder value of rm
i that plays strategy Xi 2 fC;NCg while rm j plays strategy Xj 2 fC;NCg is denoted
S (Xi; Xj) :
To focus on the strategic impact of hedging, we continue to assume that (i) there are
no transaction costs associated with hedging, and (ii) the forward price F is equal to the
expected spot price E [~c].
Proposition 6 1. Not Committing cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Whether rms
compete in quantity or in price: S (C;NC) > S (NC;NC) :
2. If rms compete in quantity, universal Not Commitment dominates universal Commit-
ment: S (NC;NC) > S (C;C) :
3. If rms compete à la Hotelling, have constant absolute risk aversion, and input costs are
normally distributed, universal Commitment dominates universal Non Commitment:
S (C;C) > S (NC;NC) and is a dominant strategy for all rms S (C;C) > S (NC;C) :
Proof. We rst prove point 1 if rms compete in quantity. Suppose rm 2 plays NC. If
rm 1 also plays NC, the shareholder value of both rms is S (NC;NC). Suppose now
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that rm 1 plays C. At t = 2, both rms select their output. Then, rm 2, which did not
commit, optimally selects complete hedging, while rm 1 has committed to H1. Assuming the
equilibrium (q1 (H1) ; q2 (H1)) is interior, it is characterized by the rst-order conditions:8><>: q2P
0
(q1 + q2) + P (q1 + q2)  F = 0
q1P
0
(q1 + q2) + P (q1 + q2)  bc (q1; q2; H1) = 0
At t = 1, rm 1 selects H1 to maximize Z (H1) = V (q1 (H1) ; q2 (H1) ; H1). If rm 1 selects
H1 = q
C (F; F ), then q1 = q2 = qC (F; F ) is a solution of the system, hence is the unique
Cournot equilibrium for H1 = qC (F; F ). It yields the expected payo¤ S (NC;NC). Thus
when rm 2 does not commit, rm 1 can guarantee itself at least S (NC;NC) by committing
to H1 = qC (F; F ). This implies that S (C;NC)  S (NC;NC). We now show that this
inequality is strict.
dZ
dH1
 
qC (F; F )

= E

U
0
(1)

q1P
0  
Q
 dq2
dH1
+ (~c  F )

= q1P
0  
Q
 dq2
dH1
E
h
U
0
(1)
i
since bc  qC (F; F ) ; qC (F; F ) ; qC (F; F ) = F . Then, since H1 = q1, @bc1@q2 = 0, hence dq2dH1 < 0.
Thus, dZ
dH1
 
qC (F; F )

> 0, which implies that maxH1 Z(H1) > Z
 
qE (F; F )
  S (NC;NC).
Thus: S (C;NC) > S (NC;NC) :
The proof of point 1 proceeds along the same lines if rms compete in price, and is pre-
sented in Appendix C, along with the formal proof of the other points. As expected, when
rms compete in quantity, (C;C) yields lower prices and higher volatility, hence lower ex-
pected utility than (NC;NC). However if rms compete à la Hotelling, the expected prot
increase more than compensates for the loss coming from increased volatility, hence (i) uni-
versal Commitment dominates universal Non Commitment: S (C;C) > S (NC;NC), and
(ii) is a dominant strategy for all rms: S (C;C) > S (NC;C).
Even though universal Non Commitment dominates when rms compete in quantity,
each rm prefers to Commit when the other does not. Thus, whether rms compete in
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quantity or in price, universal non Commitment can never be an equilibrium.
7 Concluding remarks
This article examines how rms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market
power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing
strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy
retailing, where risk averse rms decide on their hedging strategies before their product
market strategies. We nd that hedging modies the pricing and production strategies
of rms. This strategic e¤ect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e.,
the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders risk
aversion. It has opposite e¤ects depending on the nature of product market competition:
hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, if rms
can decide not to commit on their hedging position, this can never be an equilibrium outcome:
committing is always a best response to non committing. In the Hotelling model, committing
is a dominant strategy for all rms.
This paper could be extended in di¤erent directions. For example it would be interesting
to examine asymmetric situations, where one rm is market leader and announces its hedging
strategy before the other, or when di¤erent rms have di¤erent costs. Another possibility
would be to endogenize pricing exibility, i.e., to determine when it is optimal for rms not
to adjust their output prices to reect the realization of their input costs.
Finally, another avenue of research is to bring the model to the data, and in particular to
test the predictions as to how rmshedging decisions inuence their and their competitors
pricing strategies. For econometricians, this naturally leads to the question : which model
of competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) is best suited to describe the industry of interest?
This is an empirical question. As clearly articulated by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), these
two models should not be taken literally as resulting from a di¤erent choice of strategies
(price vs. quantity). Instead, they have to be interpreted as two reduced forms models for
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the joint determination of prices and outputs. The choice between the two must be guided
by the best t to the data in the particular industry under study.
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A Quantity competition
A.1 Deterministic input cost (Lemma 1)
Condition 2 guarantees that @
2Ci
(@qi)
2 < 0. Thus, if an interior Cournot equilibrium exists, it is
characterized by the necessary rst-order conditions (3). Assumption 1 guarantees that, for
all c > 0, the equation
A (Q) = 2P (Q) +QP 0 (Q) = c
admits a unique solution QC (c). When the equilibrium is interior
 
qCi > 0 for i = 1; 2

, the
equilibrium quantities are:
qC (ci; cj) =
P
 
QC (ci + cj)
  ci
( P 0 (QC (ci + cj))) :
Finally, we verify that:
@qCi
@ci
=
@qC (ci; cj)
@ci
=
2P
0  
QC

+ qCj P
00  
QC

P 0 (QC)
 
3P 0 (QC) +QCP
00
(QC)
 < 0 (12)
and
@qCj
@ci
=
@qC (cj; ci)
@ci
=   P
0  
QC

+ qCi P
00  
QC

P 0 (QC)
 
3P 0 (QC) +QCP
00
(QC)
 > 0: (13)
A.2 Properties of the risk-adjusted expected cost (Lemma 2)
Note rst that for any variable x :
@bci
@x
=
E [U 0 (i)]E

U 00 (i) @i@x ~c
  E [U 0 (i) ~c]E U 00 (i) @i@x 
(E [U 0 (i)])2
= 
E
h
U 0 (i)

 U 00(i)
U 0(i)
@i
@x
~c
i
E [U 0 (i)]
+
E [U 0 (i) ~c]
E [U 0 (i)]
E
h
U 0 (i)

 U 00(i)
U 0(i)
@i
@x
i
E [U 0 (i)]
= bEi  (i) @i
@x
~c

+ bcibEi  (i) @i
@x

= bEi  (i) @i
@x
(bci   ~c) :
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For any (Hi; Hj), the equilibrium
 
qi ; q

j

(Hi; Hj) of the Cournot game satises
P
 
qi + q

j

+ qi P
0  
qi + q

j

= bc  qi ; qj ; Hi :
Thus, @
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi; ~c

= P
 
qi + q

j

+qi P
0  
qi + q

j
 ~c = bc  qi ; qj ; Hi ~c: Using the above
formula with x = qi;we obtain:
@bc
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= bEi h    qi ; qj ; Hi  bc  qi ; qj ; Hi  ~c2i > 0;
which establishes the rst part of (6).
Now
bci   F = E [U 0 (i) ~c]E [U 0 (i)]   E [~c] = cov [U
0 (i) ; ~c]
E [U 0 (i)]
Since (i) U 0 (:) is non-increasing in i, and (ii) i increases in ~c if and only if Hi > qi, we
have bci  F , Hi  qi.
Moreover, @i
@Hi
= (~c  F ), thus using again the above formula with x = Hi
@bci
@Hi
= bEi [ (i) (~c  F ) (bci   ~c)] =  bEi  (i) (~c  bci)2+ (bci   F ) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)]
= 
bEi  (i) (~c  bci)2+ cov [U 0 (i) ; ~c]  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]E [U 0 (i)]

Now bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] = bEi h (i)bEi [~c]  ~ci =  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] :
Since (:) is, like U 0(:); non-increasing in i, cov [U 0 (i) ; ~c] and ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] have the same
sign. Hence @bci
@Hi
< 0: This establishes the second part of (6).
Similar algebra yields
@bci
@qj
= bEi  (i) @i
@qj
(bci   ~c) = qiP 0 (Q) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] =  qiP 0 (Q) ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] :
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which establishes (7). (8) follows from (7).
A.3 Unicity of equilibrium (Proposition 2)
As mentioned in the main text, the equilibrium of the production game (q1; q

2) (H1; H2) is
unique if the real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian J (q1; q

2; H1; H2) are negative,
where
J (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
264 @qE1@q1   1 @qE1@q2
@qE2
@q1
@qE2
@q2
  1
375 :
This is an application of Lyapunov stability theorem (see for example Khalil (2002)). The
eigenvalues are the roots of 2   Tr + Det = 0;where Tr is the trace of J and Det its
determinant. The roots are:  = Tr
p
Tr2 4Det
2
. If Tr2   4Det < 0, the two roots are
complex and conjugate. Their real part is negative if and only if Tr < 0. If Tr2  4Det  0,
the two roots are real. Tr+
p
Tr2   4Det < 0 requires Tr < 0 and Det > 0. Thus, we have
to show that Tr < 0 and Det > 0. We have:
Tr =

@qC1
@q1
+
@qC2
@q2
  2

:
By denition, qCi = q
C (bc (qi; qj; Hi) ;bc (qj; qi; Hj) ; Hi) ;for i = 1; 2, thus
@qCi
@qi
=
@qCi
@ci
@bci
@qi
+
@qCi
@cj
@bcj
@qi
; (14)
and
@qCi
@qj
=
@qCi
@ci
@bci
@qj
+
@qCi
@cj
@bcj
@qj
: (15)
Thus, Tr = @q
C
1
@c1
@bc1
@q1
+
@qC1
@c2
@bc2
@q1
+
@qC2
@c2
@bc2
@q2
+
@qC2
@c1
@bc1
@q2
  2:
Lemma 2 shows that, when  is constant, @bc1
@q2
= @bc2
@q1
= 0: Thus
Tr (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
@qC1
@c1
 
@bc1
@q1
+
+
@qC2
@c2
 
@bc2
@q2
+
  2 <  2:
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We now examine Det (q1; q

2; H1; H2).
Det =

@qC1
@q1
  1

@qC2
@q2
  1

  @q
C
1
@q2
@qC2
@q1
=
@qC1
@q1
@qC2
@q2
  @q
C
1
@q2
@qC2
@q1
  @q
C
1
@q1
  @q
C
2
@q2
+ 1
Substituting @q
C
i
@qi
and @q
C
i
@qj
from equations (14) and (15), and simplifying yields
@qC1
@q1
@qC2
@q2
  @q
C
1
@q2
@qC2
@q1
=

@qC1
@c1
@qC2
@c2
  @q
C
1
@c2
@qC2
@c1

@bc1
@q1
@bc2
@q2
  @bc1
@q2
@bc2
@q1

:
Now, substituting in @q
C
i
@ci
and
@qCj
@ci
from equations (12) and (13), and simplifying yields
@qC1
@c1
@qC2
@c2
  @q
C
1
@c2
@qC2
@c1
=
1
P 0 (QE)
 
3P 0 (QE) +QP
00
(QE)
 :
Thus,
Det =
@bc1
@q1
@bc2
@q2
  @bc1
@q2
@bc2
@q1
P 0 (QC)
 
3P 0 (QC) +QCP
00
(QC)
   Tr   1:
Then, with  constant, we know that @bc2
@q1
= @bc1
@q2
= 0: Moreover, @bc1
@q1
< 0 and @bc2
@q2
< 0: Thus
Det >  Tr   1 > 1:
A.4 Impact ofHi on qj with constant absolute risk aversion (Propo-
sition 2)
Dene  (qi; qj; Hi) = P (Q)  bc (qi; qj; Hi) + qiP 0 (Q) :
The rst order conditions characterizing the unique equilibrium of the production game
can be written as  
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

=  
 
qj ; q

i ; Hj

= 0: Total di¤erentiation of these conditions
with respect to Hi yields:8><>:

 1
@qi
@Hi
+  2
@qj
@Hi
+  3
  
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0
 1
@qj
@Hi
+  2
@qi
@Hi
  
qj ; q

i ; Hj

= 0
;
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where 8>>>><>>>>:
 1 (qi; qj; Hi) = 2P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj) @bci@qi
 2 (qi; qj; Hi) = P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj)  @bci@qj
 3 (qi; qj; Hi) =   @bci@Hi > 0
:
The determinant of the above linear system is
 =  1
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

 1
 
qj ; q

i ; Hj
   2  qi ; qj ; Hi 2  qj ; qi ; Hj ;
thus 8><>:
@q
@Hi
(Hi; Hj) =   1(q

j ;q

i ;Hj)

 3
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

@q
@Hi
(Hj; Hi) =
 2(qj ;qi ;Hj)

 3
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi
 :
If  is constant, @bci
@qj
= 0, thus
 2 (qi; qj; Hi) = P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj)<0:
Then:
=

2P
0
(Q) + qi P
00
(Q) @bci
@qi

2P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q) @bcj
@qj

 

P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q)

P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q)

=

P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi

P
0
(Q) @bcj
@qj

+

P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi

P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q)

+

P
0
(Q) @bcj
@qj

P
0
(Q) + qi P
00
(Q)

:
Since all terms in parentheses are negative,  > 0. Thus
@qj
@Hi
=
@q
@Hi
(Hj; Hi) =
 2
 
qj ; q

i ; Hi


 3
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

< 0:
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B Price competition
Dene  (pi; pj; Hi) = @D@pi (pi; pj) (pi   bc (pi; pj; Hi)) +D (pi; pj) ; where
bci  bc (pi; pj; Hi)  E [U 0 ( (pi; pj; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (pi; pj; Hi; ~c))]
is the risk-adjusted expected cost of rm i. Suppose a unique interior equilibrium of the pric-
ing game (p1; p

2) (H1; H2) exists. The rst-order conditions characterizing this equilibrium
are
 
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

=  
 
pj ; p

i ; Hj

= 0:
Assuming  =  1
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

 1
 
pj ; p

i ; Hj
   2  pi ; pj ; Hi 2  pj ; pi ; Hj 6= 0;
8><>:
@pi
@Hi
= @p

@Hi
(Hi; Hj) =   1(p

j ;p

i ;Hj)

 3
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

@pj
@Hi
= @p

@Hi
(Hj; Hi) =
 2(pj ;pi ;Hj)

 3
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi
 ;
where 8>>>><>>>>:
 1 (pi; pj; Hi) = 2
@Di
@pi
+ (pi   bci) @2Di(@pi)2   @Di@pi @bci@pi
 2 (pi; pj; Hi) =
@Di
@pj
+ (pi   bci) @2Di@pi@pj   @Di@pi @bci@pj
 3 (pi; pj; Hi) =  @Di@pi @bci@Hi :
:
B.1 Impact of ci on pCi and p
C
j (constant input costs)
Suppose rst the marginal costs are constant:
 (pi; pj; ci) =
@D (pi; pj)
@pi
(pi   ci) +D (pi; pj)
and 8>>>><>>>>:
 1 (pi; pj; ci) = 2
@Di
@pi
+ (pi   ci) @2Di(@pi)2
 2 (pi; pj; ci) =
@Di
@pj
+ (pi   ci) @2Di@pi@pj
 3 (pi; pj; ci) =  @Di@pi
:
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Assumption 2 guarantees (i) existence and unicity of an equilibrium
 
pB (ci; cj) ; p
B (cj; ci)

,
(ii)  1 (pi; pj; ci) < 0, since 
B (pi; pj; ci) is concave in pi, (iii)  2
 
pB (ci; cj) ; p
B (cj; ci) ; ci

>
0, since prices are strategic complements, and (iv) ( 1 +  2)
 
pB (ci; cj) ; p
B (cj; ci) ; ci

< 0
since the own price e¤ect dominates. Thus
B =  1
 
pBi ; p
B
j ; ci

 1
 
pBj ; p
B
i ; cj
   2  pBi ; pBj ; ci 2  pBj ; pBi ; cj > 0
and 8>>><>>>:
@pBi
@ci
= @p
B
@ci
(ci; cj) =
@Di
@pi
 1(pBj ;pBi ;cj)
E
= @Di
@pi
2
@Dj
@pj
+(pj cj) @
2Dj
(@pj)
2
E
> 0
@pBj
@ci
= @p
B
@ci
(cj; ci) =  @Di@pi
 2(pBj ;pBi ;cj)
E
=  @Di
@pi
@Dj
@pi
+(pj cj) @
2Dj
@pi@pj
E
> 0
:
B.2 Properties of the risk-adjusted expected cost (Lemma 3)
For any (pi; pj; Hi) ; the same derivation as for Cournot competition yields:
@bci
@Hi
= bEi [ (i) (~c  F ) (bci   ~c)] =  bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2+ (bci   F ) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] :
= 
 bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2+ cov U 0 (i) ; ~c  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]E [U 0 (i)]
!
:
Since (i)  (:) and U
0
(:) are both non-increasing, and (ii) i increases in ~c if and only if
Hi > D (pi; pj), we have (i) cov

U
0
(i) ; ~c
  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]  0, thus @bci@Hi < 0, and (ii) andbci  F , Hi  D (pi; pj). Similarly,
@bci
@pj
= bEi  (i) @i
@pj
(bci   ~c) = @Di
@pj
bEi [ (i) (pi   ~c) (bci   ~c)]
=
@Di
@pj
n
(pi   bci) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] + bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2o :
Thus: @bc
@pj
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

= @Di
@pj

Di
@Di
@pi
ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] + bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2 : Then:
Hi > D
 
pi ; p

j
, ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] < 0) @bc
@pj
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

> 0:
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Finally:
@bci
@pi
= bEi  (i) @i
@pi
(bci   ~c) :
Then, @
@pi
=

(bci   ~c) @Di@pi   pi ; pj ; Hi and thus @bc@pi = @D@pi bEi  (i) (bci   ~c)2 < 0.
C Strategic incentives to commit (Proposition 6)
C.1 Comparing S (C;NC) and S (NC;NC) when rms compete in
price
Suppose rm 2 plays NC, while rm 1 plays C. At t = 2, rm 2 chooses H2 = D (p2; p1),
after rms simultaneously select prices (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1)) that solve:8><>:D (p1; p2) + (p1   bc (p1; p2; H1))
@D
@p1
(p1; p2) = 0
D (p2; p1) + (p2   F ) @D@p2 (p2; p1) = 0
At t = 1, rm 1 selects H1 that maximizes Z (H1) = E [U ( (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1) ; H1))]. As
in the Cournot case, if rm 1 chooses H1 = D
 
pB (F; F ) ; pB (F; F )

= D0=2, p1 = p2 =
pB (F; F ) is a solution of the system, hence the unique equilibrium. The shareholder value
of both rms is S (NC;NC). Thus rm 1 can guarantee itself at least S (NC;NC),which
implies that S (C;NC)  S (NC;NC). To prove that the inequality is strict, it su¢ ces to
show that dZ
dH1
(D0=2) 6= 0: This is easy, since
dZ
dH1
(D0=2) =
@D1
@p2
 
pB (F; F )  F @p2
@H1
E
h
U
0
(1)
i
< 0:
Thus, if the rm hedges
 
D0
2
  " where " > 0 is arbitrarily small, it can obtain Z  D0
2
  " >
Z
 
D0
2

. Thus, S (C;NC) > S (NC;NC).
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C.2 Comparing S (C;C) and S (NC;NC) if rms compete in quan-
tity
S (C;C) = E

U

(P (Q)  F ) Q

2
+ (H  Q) (!   F )

< U

(P (Q)  F ) Q

2

since U (:) is concave, and
S (NC;NC) = U
  
P
 
2qC (F; F )
  F qC (F; F ) :
For x  0, denote f (x) = (P (2x)  F )x. Condition 2 implies that f (:) is globally concave
and admits a unique maximum x dened by f
0
(x) = P (2x) F +2xP 0 (2x) = 0. Then,
f
0  
qC (F; F )

=  qC (F; F )P 0  2qC (F; F )+2qC (F; F )P 0  2qC (F; F ) = qC (F; F )P 0  2qC (F; F ) < 0;
hence qE (F; F ) > x. Then, f
 
qE (F; F )

> f (q) since q > qE (F; F ) and f (:) is decreas-
ing for x  x. Thus: S(C;C) < U (f (q)) < U  f  qC (F; F ) = S (NC;NC) :
C.3 Hotelling competition
We have seen in the text that
S (C;C) =
t
2
[1 +
"(5 + 8"+ 3"2)
2(3 + 2")2
] >
t
2
= S (NC;NC) :
Suppose that rm 2 plays NC, while rm 1 plays C and chooses hedging H1. We
prove that S (C;C) > S (NC;C). The equilibrium prices (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1)) are given by the
Hotelling formula:
8><>:p1 = t+
1
3

2

F + 2

p2 p1
2t
+ 1
2
 H1

+ F

= t+ F + 4t"
3

p2 p1
2t
+ 1
2
 H1

p2 = t+
1
3

2F +

F + 2

p2 p1
2t
+ 1
2
 H1

= t+ F + 2t"
3

p2 p1
2t
+ 1
2
 H1
 :
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Taking the di¤erence, we obtain
p2   p1 =  
2t"
3

p2   p1
2t
+
1
2
 H1

thus
p2   p1 =  2t
"
3 + "

1
2
 H1

and
D1  H1 = p2   p1
2t
+
1
2
 H1 = 3
3 + "

1
2
 H1

:
Equilibrium prices are given by
p1   F = t
 
1 + 4"
3+"
 
1
2
 H1

p2   F = t
 
1 + 2"
3+"
 
1
2
 H1

Note that
@p2
@H1
=   2t"
3 + "
< 0:
Maximization of M1 over H1 yields:
1
2t
 
p1   F + 2 (H1  D1)
 @p2
@H1
  2 (H1  D1) = 0
or nally
1
2
 H1 = 3 + "
2 (9 + 4")
:
This implies that p2   F = t
 
1 + "
9+4"

and D (p2; p1) =
1
2
 
1 + "
9+4"

:Thus
S (NC;C) =

1 +
"
9 + 4"
2
t
2
:
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Finally,
S (C;C) > S (NC;C)() 1 + "(5 + 8"+ 3"
2)
2(3 + 2")2
> 1 +
9"(2 + ")
(9 + 4")2
()
(5 + 8"+ 3"2) (9 + 4")2 > 18(2 + ")(3 + 2")2
which is veried for all "  0.
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